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ESSAY
COMBAT VETERANS, MENTAL
HEALTH ISSUES, AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
Anthony E. Giardino*
More than 1.5 million Americans have participated in combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past seven years. Some of these veterans
have subsequently committed capital crimes and found themselves in our
nation 's criminal justice system. This Essay argues that combat veterans
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury at
the time of their offenses should not be subject to the death penalty.
Offering mitigating evidence regarding military training, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and traumatic brain injury presents one means that combat
veterans may use to argue for their lives during the sentencing phase of
their trials. Alternatively, Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons offer a
framework for establishing a legislatively or judicially created categorical
exclusion for these offenders, exempting them from the death penalty as a
matter of law. By understanding how combat service and service-related
injuries affect the personal culpability of these offenders, the legal system
can avoid the consequences of sentencing to death America's mentally
wounded warriors, ensuring that only the worst offenders are subject to the
ultimate punishment.
INTRODUCTION
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decisions Atkins v. Virginia' and Roper v.
Simmons2 established categorical exclusions from execution for the
* J.D., magna cum laude, Boston College Law School, 2008; M.A., National Security
Studies, Georgetown University, 1998; B.S., with merit, Political Science, U.S. Naval
Academy, 1998. The author currently serves as a major in the U.S. Marine Corps. The
positions and opinions stated in this Essay are those of the author alone and do not represent
the views of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Marine Corps,
or any other governmental entity. The author thanks Emily Sack for her helpful feedback on
early drafts of this essay, and John Gordon for his advice and guidance. Most of all, the
author wishes to thank Liz and Sophie for their love and support.
1. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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mentally retarded and juveniles, the debate over who should be exempt
from the death penalty has been intense. 3 In August 2006, the American
Bar Association (ABA) weighed in and issued a report on the death penalty
that stated,
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association, without taking a
position supporting or opposing the death penalty, urges each jurisdiction
that imposes capital punishment to implement the following policies and
procedures:
1. Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the
time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both their
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, as expressed in
conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental
retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury.
2. Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the
time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability
that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature,
consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise
rational judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law. A disorder manifested
primarily by repeated criminal conduct or attributable solely to the
acute effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not,
standing alone, constitute a mental disorder or disability for purposes
of this provision.4
The ABA recommendations have been criticized for excluding too large
a class of offenders without addressing their individualized circumstances,
diagnoses, and culpability.5 Other scholars have criticized the entire notion
of categorical exclusions as creating "a psychiatric can of worms" that
raises more problems that it does solutions regarding who should be subject
to the death penalty.6 Some have also argued that categorical exclusions
2. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
3. See generally ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty,
Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006) (hereinafter ABA Report); Dora W.
Klein, Categorical Exclusions from Capital Punishment: How Many Wrongs Make a
Right?, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 1211 (2007); Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A
Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2003); Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson,
Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. LouIs U. PuB. L. REV. 351 (2006); Christopher
Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task
Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005); Ronald J. Tabak, Executing
People with Mental Disabilities: How We Can Mitigate an Aggravating Situation, 25 ST.
LouIs U. PB. L. REV. 283 (2006); Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death Penalty
Near? The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill
Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 465 (2007).
4. ABA Report, supra note 3, at 668.
5. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) ("'[T]he punishment should
be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant .. .- (quoting Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327 (1989))); ABA Report, supra note 3, at 668; Klein, supra note
3, at 1214-15, 1258-59; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1147-50.
6. Mossman, supra note 3, at 286; see also Klein, supra note 3, at 1258-59.
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ultimately work against the abolitionist movement by strengthening the
argument that the death penalty is appropriate for some offenders. 7
Even with these criticisms, there are strong arguments for not putting to
death those offenders who suffer from severe mental disorders or mental
defects that impair their ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their
conduct or to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. 8
Fortunately, capital defendants suffering from severe mental disorders, such
as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or mental defects, such as
traumatic brain injury (TBI), enjoy wide latitude to argue for their lives by
putting on any relevant mitigating evidence during the sentencing phases of
their trials. 9 Arguing for a legislatively or judicially created categorical
exclusion presents another means by which defendants with certain mental
disorders or defects can avoid the death penalty in light of the risk that
mitigating evidence based on psychology or psychiatry will be undervalued,
misunderstood, or treated as an aggravating factor by a sentencer.10
In particular, combat veterans deserve special consideration when
determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.1" For more than
seven years, we have been a nation at war. For most people, life has gone
on, and very few in society have any connection whatsoever to the
military. 12 One study indicates that, of veterans who returned from ground
combat duty in 2004, 89% reported having been "attacked or ambushed" by
the enemy during their tour of duty, and 93% reported having been shot at
or receiving small arms fire. 13 The Veterans Administration has already
7. See Klein, supra note 3, at 1258; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 359-60; Shin,
supra note 3, at 516.
8. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (section
titled "Sentence of Death for Murder; Further Proceedings to Determine Sentence"); ABA
Report, supra note 3, at 668; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1139-47; Shin, supra note 3, at 513-
16.
9. See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (2006) ("In aggregate, our precedents
confer upon defendants the right to present sentencers with information relevant to the
sentencing decision and oblige sentencers to consider that information in determining the
appropriate sentence."); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004); McKoy, 494 U.S. at
435; infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
10. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-79 (2005); Tennard, 542 U.S. at 288-89;
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-21 (2002); John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation
and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 73, 90 (2003); Leona
D. Jochnowitz, Missed Mitigation: Counsel's Evolving Duty to Assess and Present
Mitigation at Death Penalty Sentencing, 43 CRiM. L. BULL. 3, 5 (2007); Ryan & Berson,
supra note 3, at 376-77; infra Part III.A.
11. See, e.g., Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1993) (Kogan, J.,
concurring) ("When this death warrant is executed, Florida will electrocute a man injured
and most probably maimed psychologically while serving in his nation's military in Vietnam
and elsewhere."); infra notes 34-66 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., James P. McGovern, Editorial, The Iraq Money Pit, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
4, 2007, at A9.
13. See Kevin Bowe, A Prosecutor Anticipates Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, 39
PROSECUTOR 30, 36 (2005) (citing Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat Duty in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 13, 16-
17, 18 & tbl.2 (2004) ("Respondents to our survey who had been deployed to Iraq reported a
very high level of combat experiences, with more than 90 percent of them reporting being
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diagnosed more than 90,000 combat veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan as
possibly suffering from PTSD and estimates indicate that as many as
100,000 veterans will require mental health support due to PTSD in the
future. 14 Additionally, an April 2008 RAND Corporation report, "Invisible
Wounds of War," (RAND Report) found that about 300,000 military
veterans who deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan presently suffer from PTSD,
or about 20% of the 1.64 million veterans who served in those
environments. 15
Also overlooked is the fact that there have been more than 1800 combat
veterans diagnosed as suffering from service-related TBIs due to the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 16 According to experts, tens of
thousands of combat veterans are suspected of having suffered a mild form
of TBI, an injury for which the long-term effects are unknown. 17 The
RAND Report further estimates that over 300,000 veterans of Iraq and
Afghanistan have suffered some form of a TBI. 18 Because TBIs are
primarily caused by the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are the
preferred weapon used by insurgents against American forces, these injuries
have become known as the "signature wound" of the war on terror. 19
shot at and a high percentage reporting handling dead bodies, knowing someone who was
injured or killed, or killing an enemy combatant (Table 2).")).
14. See Bowe, supra note 13, at 36; Press Release, Senator John F. Kerry, The Battle
Within: Washington Must Stop Ignoring Hidden War Wounds (Aug. 11, 2006), available at
http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=265327; see also Hoge et al., supra note 13, at 16;
William H. McMichael, VA Diagnosing Higher Rates of PTSD, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Jan.
18, 2009, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/0 1/military-veterans carestats_
011609w/.
15. CTR. FOR MIL. HEALTH POL'Y RESEARCH, INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST
RECOVERY, at xxi, 434-35 (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. Jaycox eds., 2008); see Lizette
Alvarez, Nearly a Fifth of War Veterans Report Mental Disorders, a Private Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A20; Ann Scott Tyson, Combat Stress May Cost US. up to $6
Billion, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2008, at A18; see Marek M. Sipko, Combat Operational
Stress Control: Prevention Through Training and Education, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE,
Nov. 2008, at 77, 77-80 (discussing the increased incidence of mental disorders, alcohol
abuse, drug abuse, and PTSD diagnoses in the Marine Corps since the start of combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan).
16. Ronald Glasser, A Shock Wave of Brain Injuries, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2007, at BI.
17. See Charles W. Hoge et al., Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in US. Soldiers Returning
from Iraq, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 453, 454 (2008) ("[L]ittle is known about the
epidemiology of mild traumatic brain injury during deployment and its association with
adverse health outcomes after deployment."); Benedict Carey, Battle Concussions Tied to
Stress Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at A21; Gina Cavallaro, TBI Task Force
Identifies Deficiencies in Care: Mild Injuries Need More Attention, Experts Report, MARINE
CORPS TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at 19; Glasser, supra note 16; Kelly Kennedy, Doctor,
Engineers Discover TBI Detection Breakthrough: Portable Equipment Could Be Used to
Find Injury in Field, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at 16.
18. Alvarez, supra note 15; Tyson, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Hoge et al., supra note 17, at 454 ("Traumatic brain injury has been labeled
a signature injury of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."); Joshua Holland, Editorial, 4,000
Doesn't Even Begin to Tell the Toll of Iraq War, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at 21.
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Not surprisingly, U.S. courts are beginning to see these afflicted combat
veterans on trial for capital crimes.20 If the death penalty is truly only for
the worst offenders, justice requires that combat veterans 21 suffering, at the
time of their offenses,22 from service-related 23 PTSD or TBI not be
executed or sentenced to death. 24 This should be so because PTSD is a
20. See, e.g., Dennis Huspeni, Soldier's Murder Trial Opens Today, GAZETTE (Colo.
Springs), Nov. 1, 2008, available at http://www.gazette.com/articles/eastridge-
42727 article.html/courtfarry.html (discussing case of Louis Bressler and other soldiers
from the Fort Carson area who are facing first-degree murder charges for a murder that took
place after their return from Iraq); David Olinger, Deadly Duty, DENVER POST, Nov. 15,
2008, at IA ("In three years, nine men from [the 3700-soldier 4th Brigade Combat Team]
have been charged in 10 murders and attempted homicides, all but two in or around
Colorado Springs."); Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of
Foreign Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at Al; Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez,
Combat Trauma Takes the Witness Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at Al [hereinafter
Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma]; Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez, When Strains on
Military Families Turn Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Sontag &
Alvarez, When Strains]; David Young, Cortez Gets Life Plus 80 Years, GREELEY TRIBUNE
(Colo.), Nov. 13, 2008, at A2, available at http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/
20081113/NEWSO1/811139993/1051 &parentprofile= 1001 &title=Cortez%20gets%201ife%2
Oplus%2080%20years (discussing the case of Ricardo Cortez, a veteran of two tours in Iraq,
who was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting deaths of his estranged wife and
unborn child after unsuccessfully arguing insanity due to PTSD); Angela K. Brown, Marine
Charged in Ex-girlfriend's Death, USA TODAY, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2008-03-27-1913814200_x.htm (discussing case of Eric Acevedo, who was
charged with capital murder after stabbing his ex-girlfriend to death); The Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/01/12/us/20080113-
VETSDATABASE.html; see also Susan Davies, Troop-Related Felonies Expected to
Increase, KOAA.COM, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.koaa.com/aaaa-top-stories/x407184412/
Troop-related-felonies-expected-to-increase.
21. For the purposes of this Essay, the term "combat veteran" refers to one who has
served or is serving in the armed forces during a war or contingency operation and has been
involved in hostilities by either taking fire from or returning fire with an enemy force. See
infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. "The term 'contingency operation' means a
military operation that... is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or
hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force ... 
10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2006).
22. Because the effects of either post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic
brain injury (TBI) persist for years, even decades, after exposure to a combat environment or
a service-related head injury, a combat veteran may use the concepts discussed in this paper
so long as it can be determined by a prior or forensic diagnosis by a mental health
professional that the mental health issue existed at the time of the offense. See, e.g., Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702-19 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So.
2d 575, 580 (Fla. 1993).
23. See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
24. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (holding that the death sentence is
improper for those who are not the "worst offenders"); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318
(2002) (holding that the death sentence is improper for those with "diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others"); ABA Report, supra note 3, at 668 (saying that the death sentence is
improper for those suffering from TBI or a severe mental disorder at the time of the offense);
Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1135-36. There is some indication that mild TBIs are strongly
associated with the development of PTSD and physical health problems in combat veterans.
See Hoge et al., supra note 17, at 453, 457, 461-62.
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severe mental disorder 25 that can cause "acting or feeling as if the traumatic
event were recurring (includ[ing] ... dissociative flashback episodes... ),"
"intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that
symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event," "difficulty falling
or staying asleep," "irritability or outbursts of anger," "difficulty
concentrating," "hypervigilance," and "exaggerated startle response. '26
And, TBI is a mental defect that can cause "a number of deficits in
intellectual and adaptive functioning, such as agnosia (failure to recognize
or identify objects) and disturbances in executive functioning connected
with planning, organizing, sequencing, and abstracting. '27
The effects of PTSD and TBI do not necessarily excuse criminal actions,
but do reduce the personal culpability of combat veterans for their capital
crimes because "[a]t the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental
disease or defect."'28  Mitigating evidence regarding this diminished
culpability due to the existence of PTSD or TBI in combat veterans at the
time of the offense should be given great weight by the sentencer in
determining whether or not death is the appropriate punishment.29
Additionally, the rationale used by the Supreme Court in Roper and Atkins
to create categorical exclusions for juveniles and the mentally retarded
could support a further argument for excluding certain combat veterans
from the application of the death penalty as a matter of law. 30
25. M. B. FIRST ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, U.S. DEP'T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, STRUCTURED CLINICAL INTERVIEW FOR THE DSM-IV Axis I
DISORDERS (SCID PTSD MODULE) (1996), available at http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/
ncdocs/assmnts/structuredclinicalinterview for the dsmivaxis i-disordersscidptsd_m
odule.html?printable-template=assessment (noting that PTSD is an Axis I diagnosis); ABA
Report, supra note 3, at 670 (explaining that a severe mental disorder is one "roughly
equivalent to disorders that mental health professionals would consider the most serious
'Axis I diagnoses'); PsychNet-UK, DSM IV Explained, http://www.psychnet-uk.com/
dsm iv/ misc/dsmdiagnosis.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (explaining what defines and
distinguishes different Axis categories in the DSM-IV).
26. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 467-68 (4th rev. ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; CLAUDIA BAKER & CESSIE
ALFONSO, NAT'L CTR. FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, FORENSIC VALIDITY OF A PTSD DIAGNOSIS (n.d.), available at
http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/fact-shts/fsforensic.html?opm 1 &rr=rr92&srt=d
&echorr-true; Nicholas J. Motherway, Post-traumatic Stress, 49 AM. JuR. 2D Proof of Facts
73, §§ 4-10 (2007); infra Part lI.B.
27. ABA Report, supra note 3, at 669-70; see also Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1135-36;
infra Part II.C.
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g); see also ; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26; BAKER &
ALFONSO, supra note 26; Barry L. Levin, Defense of the Vietnam Veteran with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 46 AM. JUR. Trials 441, §§ 5, 17-24; Motherway, supra note 26,
§§ 4-10; D. Michael Bitz & Jean Sepp Bitz, Incompetence in the Brain Injured Individual,
12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 205, 230-34 (1999); Tabak, supra note 3, at 293.
29. See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287-89 (2004); DSM-IV-TR, supra note
26; BAKER & ALFONSO, supra note 26; Bitz & Bitz, supra note 28, at 230-34.
30. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-79 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 311-21 (2002).
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Because the existence of service-related PTSD or TBI in combat veterans
reduces personal culpability, they cannot be regarded as "among the worst
offenders" and should not be subject to the ultimate sentence. 31 Presenting
PTSD, TBI, and military training evidence to a sentencer during the
sentencing phase of a capital trial represents one way to avoid subjecting
combat veterans to the death penalty. 32 Because the characteristics of those
suffering from PTSD and TBI are similar to those of minors and the
mentally retarded, legislatures or the courts should create a categorical
exclusion from the death penalty for combat veterans suffering from PTSD
or TBI at the time of their offenses to ensure that only the worst offenders
are put to death. 33
This Essay examines these issues and argues against imposing the death
penalty on combat veterans who were suffering, at the time of their
offenses, from service-related PTSD or TBI. Part I explains why combat
veterans are a distinct and special population of offenders who should be
treated differently for purposes of the death penalty. Part II addresses the
different types of mitigating evidence that a combat veteran can present to
argue for his or her life during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Part
III discusses the role categorical exclusions can play in the imposition of
the death penalty and argues that there should be a narrow categorical
exclusion for certain combat veterans. Lastly, this Essay concludes with a
summary of the issues presented and a restatement of the main points to
consider when combat veterans are involved in capital crimes.
I. DISTINGUISHING COMBAT VETERANS FROM OTHER OFFENDERS
How can one distinguish a combat veteran with service-related PTSD or
TBI from a battered woman with PTSD or an adult who suffered a TBI as a
youth? How can one distinguish a combat veteran with PTSD or TBI from
a veteran who served in peacetime and suffered a TBI in military training?
When combat veterans use their military service, PTSD, or TBI as
mitigating evidence to argue against the imposition of the death penalty,
courts and sentencers are reluctant to acknowledge that they should be
treated any differently than other classes of offenders. 34 The distinguishing
characteristic, however, is that combat veterans would not have service-
related PTSD or TBI but for government action in the form of training them
to kill and sending them to war.35
31. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
32. See Levin, supra note 28, §§ 37-38.
33. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79;Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21.
34. See, e.g., Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20.
35. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (discussing transformation of enlistees into
persons with a "warrior identity" and "central focus upon killing" (citing ROBERT JAY
LIFTON, HOME FROM THE WAR: VIETNAM VETERANS: NEITHER VICTIMS NOR EXECUTIONERS
28 (1973))); Sontag & Alvarez, When Strains, supra note 20 ("'I am quite sure that, but for
the war, he would have taken a different approach. When you see people being shot every
day, death is not a big thing."' (quoting the brother-in-law of a combat veteran who
committed a murder-suicide)); Brown, supra note 20 (discussing what Eric Acevedo's
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There is something very unique about a normal young man or woman
who volunteers to serve his or her country, who is trained to kill other
people, who is sent to war by the government and exposed to combat, and
then returns a changed person that ends up committing a capital crime. 36
Some courts and states recognize the psychological wounds of war and try
to give credit for the service of combat veterans in their sentencing
calculus. 37 Many courts, however, would rather ignore this elephant in the
room than confront the reality that the combined effect of government-
sponsored military training and combat exposure transforms men and
women into something quite different from their former selves.38
Facts relating to exposure to combat and government-sponsored military
training present a unique form of mitigating evidence that can aid in
distinguishing combat veterans from the "average" offender for purposes of
imposing the death penalty. 39 Exposure to combat is most often the
triggering event that causes service-related PTSD in combat veterans.40
IED blasts are most often the cause of combat-related TBIs.41 Because
there is often a clear link between combat- and service-related PTSD or
TBI, one can easily distinguish these combat veterans from other offenders
with PTSD or TBI because of the government's involvement in sending
them to war where these disabilities were incurred.42
mother said about her son who is currently facing capital murder charges: "I gave him to the
government nice and healthy, and the government returned somebody who is capable of
[murdering an ex-girlfriend with a kitchen knife]").
36. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 704-05 (2002) (discussing dramatic changes in
Gary Cone's character following combat service in Vietnam); Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So.
2d 575, 580 (Fla. 1993) ("This is a man who devoted his adult life to the defense of his
nation, who then was abandoned without the medical intervention he obviously needed after
being injured while on his nation's business."); Levin, supra note 28, § 5; Dennis H. Grant,
Letter to the Editor, Psychological Damage of Combat, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2, 271
(1991) ("And yet I find it hard to believe that any human being is made for trauma, is made
to be traumatized, or comes through it unscathed. I find it hard to believe that men were
made for wars."); Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20; Brown, supra note 20.
37. See, e.g., Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20; The Cases, supra note
20; infra Part III.C.2.
38. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 709-10 (discussing difficulties defense counsel faced in
admitting PTSD-related evidence); Johnson, 612 So. 2d at 581 ("I am gravely disturbed that
Johnson was not even permitted the tiniest mitigating value for his physical and mental
disabilities, nor for the one thing that caused them: his years of good and productive service
in the military."); DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING
TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY passim (1995) (discussing the killing conditioning process);
Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20 (Judge Charles B. Kommann of the U.S.
District Court for South Dakota "cautioned the jury that nobody got 'a free pass to shoot
somebody' because they 'went to Iraq or Afghanistan or the moon"'); The Cases, supra note
20.
39. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 ("hyperalert, combat-ready, and still poised for
action"); S. L. A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE PROBLEM OF BATTLE COMMAND IN
FUTURE WAR 36-43, 64-84 (William Morrow & Co. 1961) (1947); Mark S. Martins, Rules
of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1,
71-76 (1994).
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. See infra Part II.C.
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While combat exposure is the leading cause of PTSD and TBI in combat
veterans, one could argue that combat veterans with these mental illnesses
are indistinguishable for the purposes of analyzing culpability relative to
other offenders with similar mental illnesses, such as a battered woman
suffering from PTSD or an adult who suffered a TBI as a child.43 But, it is
the combination of government-sponsored combat exposure and military
training that sets these combat veterans apart as a unique and different class
of offenders. 44 Understanding how military training indoctrinates and
conditions soldiers4 5 to kill is necessary to appreciate the differences
between combat veterans and other offenders with similar mental illnesses.
Modem military training was built on the lessons of World War II. In the
aftermath of that conflict, S. L. A. Marshall, a prominent military historian,
conducted detailed interviews with veterans about how men fought and
what drove them to fight.46 His results, at least in one regard, were very
surprising. He found that as few as fifteen percent of soldiers would
consciously fire their weapon at the enemy in battle, and he backed up his
findings with historical research into past conflicts and wars. 47 These
findings were startling and begged the question in the minds of many
military leaders: why can't Johnny kill?4 8
For Marshall, the answer to increasing the lethality of soldiers came
down to training them in a different way, and his advice to the Army in
1947, was, "What we need to seek in training are any and all means by
which we can increase the ratio of effective fire when we have to go to
war."4 9 To get to that point, he made recommendations for breaking down
the "inner and usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man"
that is within all of us. 50 His suggestions were implemented by the military
in the years between World War II and the Korean War, where firing rates
in combat rose to fifty-five percent. 5' By Vietnam, the percentage of
soldiers who would fire their weapon at the enemy had risen to ninety
percent or higher.52
43. See, e.g., Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20 (jury instructions
directed granting of no "free pass" for combat service).
44. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 ("Thus, the seeds of PTSD were sown in basic combat
training. The fertilizer, water, and sunlight were Vietnam, without which all that training
was nothing more than a sophisticated and elaborate G.I. Joe war game."); Grant, supra note
36, at 271.
45. The term "soldier" is used in this Essay in the generic sense to refer to any member
of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard.
46. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 1-4; MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 5-13; Martins,
supra note 39, at 14.
47. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 4, 17-28; MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 56;
Martins, supra note 39, at 14.
48. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 29.
49. MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 23, 50-63; see also Martins, supra note 39, at 14.
50. GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 1 (quoting MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 79); see also
Levin, supra note 28, § 5; Grant, supra note 36, at 271.
51. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 251; MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 9.
52. GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 251; Chuck Vinch, On Killing: Film Explores
Warrior's Inner Struggle, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at 50.
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After WWII, a combination of stimulus-response training and
psychological inoculation increased the willingness of American soldiers to
kill during battle.53 This modern method of military training subjects
soldiers to operant conditioning in order to break down the innate
psychological resistance to killing another human being. 54 Repetitive
stimulus-response training ensures that soldiers will reflexively take another
life when a given set of circumstances exist. 55 Psychological inoculation is
imposed upon soldiers to desensitize them to the act of killing and allow
them to deny to themselves that they have killed another human being. 56
The effect of modem military training is most apparent when a combat
veteran suffering from service-related PTSD or TBI commits an act of
violence. The act of violence may take place as a reflexive response to a set
of stimuli, such as a "flashback" at the time of the killing, or as another
similar violent reaction to an event due to the judgment-altering effects of
PTSD or TBI.57 Because military personnel have been conditioned to kill,
53. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 160-64, 251-64;
MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 36-43, 50-84; Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76. See generally
BRUCE K. SIDDLE, SHARPENING THE WARRIOR'S EDGE (1998) (discussing modem use of
psychological methods to train people for combat situations).
54. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 1, 81-82, 160-64, 251-64; MARSHALL, supra note
39, at 36-43, 50-84; Mark S. Martins, Deadly Force Is Authorized, but Also Trained, ARMY
L., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 1, 3-5, 8-9, 15; Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76.
55. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (discussing the link between military indoctrination
and "all the incessant marching, pugil and bayonet training, guard duty, [kitchen patrol
duty], and the overwhelming demand to obey authority without question"); GROSSMAN,
supra note 38, at 233, 252-61; Martins, supra note 54, at 9 (discussing the training of
soldiers in reflexive shooting techniques to ensure "rapid incapacitation of the threat" and
"to inculcate effective responses under the stress of a deadly force encounter, when visual
narrowing, auditory exclusion, decreased fine motor skills, and other symptoms are to be
expected"); Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76 (discussing the U.S. Army's use of cognitive
psychology and human learning theories in military training to improve decision making and
actions under stress). The objective of military training is not to create one who can kill
without remorse or restraint. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 251-64. Rather, all military
combat training assumes that a soldier will think rationally in deciding when and whether to
kill another human being. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 260-
61; Martins, supra note 54, at 5, 8-9, 15; Martins, supra note 39, at 71. The duty to obey
regulations and orders of superiors serves as a check on the use of deadly force in combat
and peacetime by soldiers. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 260-61. See generally Mark J.
Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REv.
939 (1998) (discussing the role of authority and obedience to orders in the military).
56. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (discussing the need for soldiers to be desensitized "to
common everyday events" in order to be an effective killer on the battlefield); GROSSMAN,
supra note 38, at 81-82, 160-64, 251-64 (discussing the role of dehumanization and
desensitization in the training of soldiers to kill); David Zucchino, When It Comes Time to
Kill, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at 1 (discussing the infantry training process for enlisted
Marines bound for Iraq).
57. See Martins, supra note 54, at 3-4; Tabak, supra note 3, at 299-300 (discussing the
case of Vietnam veteran George Franklin Page on North Carolina's death row for killing
during a manic flashback episode); Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder: A Controversial Defense for Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 415, 424-29 (1988); Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20 ("'What
does he think?' the lawyer said. 'Lethal threat, lethal threat, lethal threat, neutralize threat,
boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, continues to shoot."').
2964 [Vol. 77
COMBAT VETERANS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
desensitized to the act of killing, and taught to deny to themselves that they
have in fact killed, combat veterans who suffer from the judgment-altering
effects of PTSD and TBI are less culpable than others suffering from the
same mental illnesses.58 This is true because military training has impaired
their ability to appreciate fully the wrongfulness of killing and, when they
act violently in response to a set of stimuli, to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law.59
In distinguishing between combat veterans and peacetime veterans with
service-related PTSD or TBI who have both received this same type of
military training, the difference is that exposure to combat, in many ways, is
a unique and transformative experience for soldiers.60 A peacetime veteran
who commits a crime while suffering from service-related PTSD or TBI
may still use evidence of military training to argue for a lesser sentence.
61
While peacetime veterans may use this military training evidence to
distinguish themselves from the average offender in sentencing, they are
unlikely to find much sympathy with a court as compared to a veteran who
has also been exposed to combat, especially one who suffered from service-
related PTSD or TBI at the time of the offense.62 This is because combat
exposure is recognized as a very unique and distinguishing trait that sets a
combat veteran apart from a peacetime veteran because the combat veteran
58. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also
Levin, supra note 28, § 5; Martins, supra note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15; Martins, supra note 39, at
71-76.
59. Supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 704-05 (2001); Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So.
2d 575, 580 (Fla. 1993); State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 139-41 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)
(discussing how a soldier changed from exemplary to disturbed after enduring Iraqi SCUD
attacks during the first Gulf War); Levin, supra note 28, §§ 4-5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38,
passim; Grant, supra note 36, at 271; Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20;
Brown, supra note 20.
61. A peacetime veteran could incur PTSD or TBI through any variety of noncombat,
service-related causes ranging from training exercise accidents to incidents occurring while
performing day-to-day military duties. See, e.g., Johnson, 612 So. 2d at 578 (describing "a
freak head injury on military maneuvers"); Levin, supra note 28, § 5.
62. See, e.g., Bell, 535 U.S. at 703-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how Gary
Cone unsuccessfully attempted to use his noncombat military service as a supply clerk in
Vietnam to argue an insanity defense and to obtain a sentence other than death); Johnson,
612 So. 2d at 579-80 (describing how a Vietnam veteran facing execution who suffered
service-related head injuries should be "given proper credit for the good that he has done and
the bad that he has suffered while in service to his nation in Vietnam and elsewhere");
Phipps, 883 S.W.2d at 148, 149-51 (rejecting a diminished capacity defense based on a
claim of PTSD in a capital crime where the death penalty was not sought); Levin, supra note
28, § 5 (recounting the general impact of military training in changing behavior); Grant,
supra note 36, at 271 (illustrating the psychologically damaging effects of combat); Sontag
& Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20 (noting that a federal judge gave no downward
departure from the sentencing guidelines when sentencing a combat veteran with a severe
case of PTSD to twenty-one years in jail for second-degree murder); The Cases, supra note
20 (displaying 121 cases involving unlawful killings by combat veterans and how courts
have handled them); see also supra note 273.
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has willingly exposed himself or herself to danger in service of his or her
nation. 63
What we see as a result of the combination of military training and
exposure to combat are combat veterans who are very different than
average offenders or peacetime veterans.64  When combat exposure
additionally causes service-related PTSD or TBI in combat veterans, their
personal culpability is diminished relative to average offenders who also
suffer from PTSD or TBI, but lack the element of government-sponsored
military training.65 Combat veterans are a distinct and special population of
offenders who should be treated differently under the law because they are
far from those who are "'the most deserving of execution.' 66 Fortunately,
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment permits
combat veteran offenders to argue for their lives in capital trials in a number
of ways.
II. ARGUING FOR LIFE BY PRESENTING MITIGATING EVIDENCE
In the thirty-two years since the Supreme Court decided Gregg v.
Georgia,67 reinstating the death penalty as a potential punishment,68 the
tension between the requirement to narrow the class of offenders eligible
for the death penalty and the need for wide latitude in sentencing to allow
for individualized consideration has led to the adoption of a bifurcated
capital trial process.69 Once guilt has been established in the trial phase, the
63. See, e.g., Bell, 535 U.S. at 704-05 (illustrating a "pre-Vietnam Cone"); Johnson, 612
So. 2d at 578-79 (suggesting that the defendant lost his mind due to Vietnam experiences);
Phipps, 883 S.W.2d at 141 (discussing the defendant's experiences during combat that led to
his PTSD); Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (equating combat with nuclear winter); Grant, supra
note 36, at 271; Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20; Brown, supra note 20.
64. See Levin, supra note 28, §§ 4-5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, passim; Martins, supra
note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15; Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76 (discussing soldier training
methodology).
65. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (listing
mitigating circumstances); Levin, supra note 28, § 5.
66. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 319 (2002)).
67. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
68. Id. at 165-87.
69. See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-25 (2006) ("Together, our decisions in
Furman v. Georgia ... and Gregg v. Georgia... establish that a state capital sentencing
system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a
jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible
defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime." (citing
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189)); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) ("[T]he
punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant ......
(quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327 (1989))); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S.
422, 456-57 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Bifurcated proceedings are now the rule in
capital cases throughout the Nation."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)
("'[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment... requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the
penalty of death."' (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)));
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (requiring the application of the death
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admission of mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of these trials is
essential to meeting the requirement that the punishment fit the crime and
providing a sentence tailored to the individual. 70 To serve this end, the
Supreme Court has given defendants wide latitude to offer anything, "'if the
sentencer could reasonably find that [the information] warrants a sentence
less than death."' 71
The almost unlimited ability of a capital defendant to offer anything in
arguing for life is based on the notion that "[c]apital punishment must be
limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most
serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most
deserving of execution."' 72  In dealing with cases involving mental
illnesses, such as PTSD, and mental defects, such as TBI, the Court has
refused to limit the admission of such evidence to only the guilt phase
because "[i]mpaired intellectual functioning has mitigating dimension
beyond the impact it has on the individual's ability to act deliberately. '" 73
The Court has made clear that "[e]vidence of significantly impaired
intellectual functioning is obviously evidence that 'might serve as a basis
for a sentence less than death.' 74
In the case of combat veterans suffering from PTSD or TBI who are on
trial for their lives in the capital sentencing phase, three specific types of
mitigating evidence are particularly relevant and helpful in arguing against
the imposition of the death penalty. 75 Evidence regarding (1) military
training, (2) PTSD, and (3) TBI may be offered to show the sentencer that a
combat veteran suffering from PTSD or TBI has diminished personal
culpability that does not make him or her "'most deserving of
execution.' "76
A. Modern Military Training
The above discussion about how modem military training transforms a
citizen into a soldier is important to consider in distinguishing a combat
penalty in a nonarbitrary manner); Fabian, supra note 10, at 79 (describing the
"humanization strategy" used in the penalty phase).
70. See Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2525 ("The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the
requirement of individualized sentencing." (citing Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 484-89
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring))); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-89 (2004); McKoy,
494 U.S. at 443; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 111-12; Fabian, supra note 10, at 79.
71. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 285 (quoting McKoy, 494 U.S. at 441); see also Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) ("[I]n capital cases 'the sentencer... [must] not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."' (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110)).
72. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
73. See Tennard, 542 U.S. at 288. The Court also found that "impaired intellectual
functioning is inherently mitigating." Id. at 287.
74. Id. at 288 (quoting Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5).
75. See generally infra Part IIA-C.
76. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
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veteran with a mental illness from an "average" offender. But, in making
an argument that aspects of modem military training should be considered
as mitigating evidence, 77 this Essay explains with some detail how a
government trains its soldiers and how such training reduces culpability so
as to have a mitigating effect. 78
The process of transforming a normal, young man or woman into a
Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine to serve in defense of the United States
has commonly been referred to as an activity that breaks down the psyche
in order to build a new person in the mold of what the military desires in its
fighting men and women. 79 In this process, the objective is to develop
instant and willing obedience to orders, which ensures that military
commands and duties will be carried out without question in times of
combat, extreme stress, and fatigue. 80 The method employed by drill
instructors and other personnel who train soldiers, whether they realize it or
not, is operant conditioning. 81
Operant conditioning is one step removed from the more commonly
known method of classical conditioning. 82  Classical conditioning,
popularized by the studies and research of Ivan Pavlov, involves the simple
technique of conditioning a response based on providing a stimulus. 83 The
most famous example of classical conditioning is the creation of salivation
in a dog through the repetitive ringing of a bell at dinner time when food is
provided. 84 At the conclusion of the classical conditioning process, the dog
would salivate whenever the bell would ring regardless of whether or not
food was provided at the same time.85
Operant conditioning takes this process further to condition behaviors,
not just responses. 86 By incorporating the use of positive and negative
reinforcement techniques, it is possible to condition behaviors. 87 In the
military context, the clearest example of operant conditioning is the use of
punishments and rewards in basic training.88 A recruit in boot camp will be
rewarded for performing a task, such as shining her boots or cleaning her
77. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
78. Infra Part II.A.
79. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 28, § 5; Zucchino, supra note 56.
80. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 251-64;
MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 36-43, 50-84; Martins, supra note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15;
Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76.
81. See supra note 80.




86. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 160-64, 251-64
(describing conditioning by hate, psychological inoculation, cultural distance, and
desensitization); Martins, supra note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15 (explaining the military's deadly
force policy); Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76 (describing the rules of engagement scheme,
which teaches when soldiers should use force).
87. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 252-53.
88. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 251-64; Martins,
supra note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15; Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76.
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rifle properly, with words of praise or by not being yelled at by a drill
instructor. 89 A recruit who does not properly perform these tasks will be
yelled at and subjected to physical punishment in the form of having to do
push-ups or other physical exercises. 90  The net result of operant
conditioning in the recruit training process is that certain behaviors are
taught and indoctrinated over time so that when a recruit graduates from
basic training, she should automatically polish her boots and clean her rifle
properly in the hope of a reward or avoiding punishment. 91
In the killing context, the process is slightly more complicated, but uses
the same methodology. In training, a soldier will receive introductory
instruction in how to shoot a weapon.92 As part of this training, she will be
rewarded for being able to shoot a rifle properly with a variety of
marksmanship badges to be worn on her uniform based on accuracy of
fire. 93 Shooting well is further rewarded with praise from peers and
supervisors. 94 Failing to shoot accurately can result in punishment through
remedial training and ridicule from peers for not performing to the basic
standard.95 These skills and behaviors are reinforced and built upon once a
soldier reports to the military unit with which she will train and deploy
overseas. 96 This positive and negative reinforcement conditions a soldier to
perform the desired behavior-accurately shooting at a target.
97
Psychological inoculation goes hand-in-hand with training designed to
condition desired behavior in a fighting man or woman.98 Soldiers are
desensitized to the act of killing in boot camp and in follow-on training with
a hypermilitaristic attitude that teaches them that killing the enemy on a
89. See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 251-64; Zucchino, supra note 56.
90. See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 251-64; Zucchino, supra note 56.
91. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 251-64; Martins,
supra note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15; Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76; Zucchino, supra note 56.
92. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (discussing how the introductory training process
results in "creating a new sense of identity, structure, and social group adherence for the
inductee"); GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 177-78, 233, 253-56 (discussing initial
marksmanship training and the introductory training process); Martins, supra note 54, at 3-
4, 8-9, 15 (discussing marksmanship training and the military's focus on accurate fire and
effective target engagement); Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76 (discussing the U.S. Army's
training methodology).
93. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 177-78, 253-56 (discussing positive
reinforcement).
94. See id. at 177-78, 233, 253-56.
95. See id.
96. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (discussing the behavior of a combat-ready soldier);
GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 177-78; Martins, supra note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15; Martins,
supra note 39, at 71-76; Zucchino, supra note 56 (discussion of Iraq predeployment training
for an infantry Marine).
97. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 177-79, 253-56;
Martins, supra note 54, at 3-5, 8-9, 15; Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76; Zucchino, supra
note 56.
98. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 160-64, 251-52,
255-56; Zucchino, supra note 56.
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battlefield is a good and honorable action.99 In marksmanship training,
soldiers shoot at man-sized and man-shaped targets in order to mimic the
moment in the future when they may be called upon to aim at a person and
pull the trigger.' 00 In training with military units, hyperrealistic training is
employed, which involves everything from killing live animals to simulate
human casualties in first aid training'01 to using Hollywood-style theatrical
makeup to place realistic wounded and dead enemy soldiers in the middle
of training exercises. 102 The net effect is that a soldier is conditioned by her
government to shoot accurately at a human being when necessary,
desensitized to the act of killing, and taught that she can rationalize killing
another human being on a battlefield because it is a good and honorable
action. 103
It is not novel to say that these operant conditioning techniques provide
an explanation as to how a person's behavior changes to permit him or her
to commit an unlawful killing. 10 4 Evidence of operant conditioning and
desensitization to the act of killing has previously been used in the video
game context. 10 5 In James v. Meow Media, Inc.,106 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the effect that the repetitive playing
of role-player video games involving killing other people had on a teenager
who killed three students and wounded five others at his high school in
Paducah, Kentucky.10 7 While the court decided this civil products liability
case on other grounds, it entertained and did not dismiss the idea that one
could be conditioned and desensitized to the act of killing by repeated
exposure to realistic marksmanship-type video games.' 0 8 Other cities and
states seeking to reduce their homicide rates by banning violent video
99. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (emphasizing the value in killing and dying);
GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 160-64, 251-52, 255-56; Zucchino, supra note 56.
For example, recruits in basic training will often chant songs as they run that glorify killing
the enemy in battle. See Zucchino, supra note 56. Dehumanization is another technique that
is often employed to portray the enemy as less deserving of living. See GROSSMAN, supra
note 38, at 82, 160-64, 251-64.
100. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 177-78, 233, 253-56.
101. Jennifer Hlad, PETA Protests Use of Animals in Military Training, Jacksonville
DAILY NEWS (N.C.), Mar. 30, 2009, available at http://www.jdnews.com/common/printer/
view.php?db-jdn&id=63342 (describing how combat trauma training using live animals
"duplicat[es] the kind of stress our corpsmen might experience when they have to save a
fellow Marine or sailor").
102. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 254-56; Zucchino, supra note 56.
103. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (describing how solders become desensitized to the
violence of war); GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 160-64, 251-64; Tom Roeder, Homicides
Give Reason to Review Standards, GAZETrE (Colo. Springs), Oct. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.gazette.com/articles/army_42037 article.html/iraq-mental.html ("'For the
most part, soldiers are conditioned out of feeling empathy for the people they must
kill .... ' (quoting psychology professor Lucinda Woodward)); Zucchino, supra note 56.
104. See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 688 (6th Cir. 2002).
105. See, e.g., id. at 688, 693-95, 698; GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 299-305, 312-16.
106. 300 F.3d 683, 688 (6th Cir. 2002).
107. See id. at 688, 693-95, 698.
108. See id. at 700-01.
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games have also cited this type of conditioning as having a linkage with an
increased propensity to take human life. 109
The overall effect of state-sponsored training and techniques that
condition people to kill, desensitize them to the act of killing, and allow
them to rationalize the act of killing is that it affects, in varying degrees, the
ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of killing another person."I 0 Because
military operant conditioning promotes the behavior of killing another
person only when authorized in defined circumstances or when ordered to
by a superior, it follows that society is protected when a soldier or a veteran
is thinking and acting rationally. I 1
A rational person who has been subjected to operant conditioning by the
government still has a different perspective on the wrongfulness of killing
and a lower psychological barrier to killing another person than a non-
combat veteran offender. 112  When a soldier or veteran commits an
unlawful killing, evidence of military training has some mitigating value in
that it helps explain her mindset and actions as they relate to the act of
killing another human being. 113 If a combat veteran's judgment is impaired
by PTSD or TBI, the mitigating nature of military training evidence is
amplified to further reduce personal culpability relative to the average
offender. This is because the combination of impaired judgment and
military training significantly interferes with the ability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the act of killing and to conform one's conduct to the
requirements of the law. 114
B. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
In examining the mitigating role that PTSD plays in cases of combat
veterans suffering from the disorder at the time of a capital crime, it is very
telling that PTSD first gained formal recognition as a combat-related
109. See, e.g., H. 1423, 2007 Leg., 185th Sess. (Mass. 2007), available at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/185/ht0 pdf/ht0 1423.pdf (restricting the sale of
violent video games to minors); GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 299-305, 312-16; Bob
Egelko, Ruling Banning Age Restriction on Video Game Sales Is Upheld, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
21, 2009, at B1; Lynda Gledhill, Judge Blocks Ban on Sale of Violent Video Games to
Minors, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 2005, at Al.
110. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (explaining that psychological military training alters
human behavior regarding killing); GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 81-82, 160-64, 251-64.
111. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 251-64; Martins, supra note 39, at 71-76; supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
112. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5; Roeder, supra note 103. Michael Hagan, the civilian
coordinator for the U.S. Army's "Battlemind Training" mental health program, stated, "A
key component of [reintegration into society after combat] . . . is having soldiers turn off
instinctual reactions that saved their lives in combat." Roeder, supra note 103.
113. Levin, supra note 28, § 18.
114. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Roeder,
supra note 103 ("Ray Scurfield, a PTSD expert at the University of Southern Mississippi
Gulf Coast, said the way America is using troops in Iraq and Afghanistan makes it harder for
troops to turn off the kill-or-be-killed instincts of war.").
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disorder following the Vietnam War. 115 While PTSD has been diagnosed
in car accident victims, battered women, abused children, and other people
who have experienced traumatic events, the disorder has historically been
available to and used in courts primarily by combat veterans. 116 The
history of PTSD gives this mitigating evidence particular weight and
credibility when introduced by combat veterans in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. 117
PTSD is "not a new phenomenon." 1 8 For as long as there has been war,
there have been combat veterans who have borne the psychological scars of
battle. 19 In the aftermath of the Civil War, these mentally ill combat
veterans were said to have "'irritable heart.""' 120 After World War I, combat
veterans were said to have shell shock. 121 It was not until the aftermath of
World War II and the advent of attempts by modem mental health
professionals to treat mental illnesses that these psychological ailments
started to gain some level of formal recognition as a gross stress reaction. 122
Combat stress was referred to in early versions of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as a gross stress reaction, but
was removed from the manual as the United States entered the Vietnam
115. See Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 2-3; Timothy P. Hayes, Jr., Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder on Trial, 190 MIL. L. REv. 67, 71-72 (2006); Daniel E. Speir, Application and Use
of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder as a Defense to Criminal Conduct, ARMY L., June 1989, at
17, 17 (explaining the effect of PTSD on Vietnam veterans); Davidson, supra note 57, at
415-22 (discussing the unique Vietnam experience with PTSD).
116. See Speir, supra note 115, at 22; Davidson, supra note 57, at 424-40; see also Rich
Cholodofsky, War Stress Basis for Ex-Loyalhanna Man's Murder Case Appeal, TRIB.-REV.
(Pittsburgh), Oct. 4, 2008, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribunereview
/news/westmoreland!print_591590.html (discussing a Desert Storm veteran's request for a
new trial and desire to use PTSD as a defense to the specific intent requirement of a murder
charge).
117. See Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 2-3 (discussing the development of PTSD as a
combat-related psychological reaction); Davidson, supra note 57, at 424-40 (discussing
generally the development of the use of PTSD as a criminal defense by Vietnam veterans).
118. Motherway, supra note 26, § 2 (describing the historical background and
nomenclature of mental health problems in combat veterans); see Hayes, Jr., supra note 115,
at 69-70 (discussing the history of PTSD from the days of Hebrew civilization to present
times); Speir, supra note 115, at 17 (describing the history of PTSD); Davidson, supra note
57, at 418-20 (providing an historical overview of postcombat mental health reactions).
119. See Motherway, supra note 26, § 2; Bowe, supra note 13, at 30; Hayes, Jr., supra
note 115, at 69-72; Speir, supra note 115, at 17.
120. Hayes, Jr., supra note 115, at 70 (quoting Jo Knox & David H. Price, Healing
America's Warriors, Vet Centers and the Social Contract (Apr. 18-20, 1996) (unpublished
paper), available at http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/1996_Symposium/96
papers/healing.htm); see Bowe, supra note 13, at 30.
121. Motherway, supra note 26, § 2 (citing PETER G. BOURNE, MEN, STRESS AND
VIETNAM 10-22 (1970)); Bowe, supra note 13, at 30; Hayes, Jr., supra note 115, at 70
(citing Steve Bentley, A Short History of PTSD: From Thermopylae to Hue, Soldiers Have
Always Had a Disturbing Reaction to War, VVA VETERAN, Jan. 1991, at 11, 14); Speir,
supra note 115, at 17; Davidson, supra note 57, at 418 (citing BOURNE, supra note 121, at 6).
122. See Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 2-3 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1952)); Hayes, Jr., supra note 115, at 71
(citing Bentley, supra note 121, at 11-16); Davidson, supra note 57, at 419-20 (citing
JOSEFINA J. CARD, LIVES AFTER VIETNAM 103 (1983)).
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War.123 In many ways, this removal can be attributed to the fact that World
War II combat veterans had a much easier time dealing with the aftermath
of their combat experiences. 124 Service in the war was almost universal
amongst male citizens, there was widespread support for their service, and
there was a broad support network of family and friends that these veterans
could turn to for help after coming home. 125 Largely for these reasons,
World War II combat veterans exhibited few problems, and there was no
pressing call to recognize mental health issues that affected their behavior
or required treatment. 126
Vietnam was a different conflict that created unique issues for its combat
veterans involving mental health issues, homelessness, and substance
abuse. 127 Unlike World War II, service in Vietnam was not universal,
military service in the war was unpopular, and people who did not serve
there did not understand the difficulties of that combat environment and the
effect on mental health. 128 The rise of mental health issues in Vietnam-era
combat veterans, as compared to World War II-era combat veterans, could
also be partly accounted for by the changes to military training that broke
their psyche in order to make them better killers on the battlefield.' 29
As these disaffected combat veterans mobilized and began to advocate
for help and benefits in the 1970s, many pushed for formal recognition of
what mental health professionals were terming Vietnam Stress
Syndrome. 130 Courts were also beginning to see the introduction of
Vietnam Stress Syndrome in criminal trials as a basis for an insanity
123. Motherway, supra note 26, § 3; Davidson, supra note 57, at 419-20. The Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is the authoritative text used by mental
health professionals in assessing and diagnosing mental illnesses and disorders. See Levin,
supra note 28, §§ 17-27.
124. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 285-89; Davidson, supra note 57, at 419.
125. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 285-87; Davidson, supra note 57, at 417-19
(discussing the differences between the experiences of Vietnam veterans and World War II-
era veterans upon returning to the United States).
126. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 285-87; Davidson, supra note 57, at 416-22.
127. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 264-80, 287-89; Motherway, supra note 26, § 2;
Davidson, supra note 57, at 415-22; see also Phillip Dine, War's Legacy: Its Human Toll,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2008, at Al (comparing problems experienced by Iraq
veterans to those experienced by Vietnam veterans).
128. See GROSSMAN, supra note 38, at 264-80, 287-89; Hayes, Jr., supra note 115, at
71-72; Davidson, supra note 57, at 417-19.
129. See Levin, supra note 28, § 5 (discussing the specific military training soldiers
received during the Vietnam era); GROSSMAN, supra note 38, passim. It is important to note
that each war creates veterans with different psychological reactions, and further study of the
particular effects of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is in order. See Hoge et al.,
supra note 13, at 14 ("The all-volunteer force deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and the type
of warfare conducted in these regions are very different from those involved in past wars,
differences that highlight the need for studies of members of the armed services who are
involved in the current operations.").
130. See Motherway, supra note 26, § 2 (discussing the push to recognize the "common
pattern of psychic reaction to traumatic events" observed in Vietnam veterans in the 1970s);
Hayes, Jr., supra note 115, at 71-72 (discussing work by veterans groups and mental health
workers regarding PTSD in the 1970s); Speir, supra note 115, at 17.
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defense or other excuses regarding criminal liability. 131 While these issues
were being raised, the version of the DSM in effect since before the
Vietnam War was undergoing significant revision regarding treatment and
recognition of mental health issues based on traumatic events. 132
When the DSM-III was published in 1980, PTSD was formally
recognized as a mental disorder by the community of mental health
professionals, largely due to the widespread incidence of mental health
problems in Vietnam veterans. 133 This led to increased acceptance and use
of PTSD by combat veterans in trials because it did not require courts to
recognize the undefined concept of Vietnam Stress Syndrome based solely
on expert testimony. 134 Since being formally recognized, the use of PTSD
in trials has expanded beyond Vietnam veterans to include anyone who has
undergone a traumatic event in her life and fits within the diagnostic
criteria. 135
Although the DSM has been revised since 1980, the definition of the
symptoms and what is required to diagnose PTSD has changed very
little. 136 The current version of the DSM requires the following to diagnose
PTSD:
* Must have been exposed to a "traumatic event" involving
"actual or threatened death or serious injury" that caused a
response involving intense "fear, helplessness, or horror";
* Must exhibit specific symptoms consistent with PTSD,
such as reexperiencing the traumatic event, "avoidance of
stimuli" that recall the traumatic event, or "increased
arousal" of the senses.
* Must exhibit "clinically significant distress or impairment
in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning" after exposure to the traumatic stressor.
* Must exhibit symptoms for "more than one month"
duration. 37
131. See Speir, supra note 115, at 17-22 (discussing the early uses of PTSD as a criminal
defense and as a factor in mitigation in sentencing).
132. See Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 2-3; Hayes, Jr., supra note 115, at 71-72;
Davidson, supra note 57, at 419-22.
133. See Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 2-3; Hayes, Jr., supra note 115, at 71-72;
Davidson, supra note 57, at 419-22.
134. See Speir, supra note 115, at 17; Davidson, supra note 57, at 424-40; Sontag &
Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20.
135. See BAKER & ALFONSO, supra note 26; Motherway, supra note 26, § 2; Speir, supra
note 115, at 22.
136. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26; BAKER & ALFONSO, supra note 26; Hayes, Jr.,
supra note 115, at 72; Levin, supra note 28, §§ 17-27; Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 4-10.
137. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26; see BAKER & ALFONSO, supra note 26; Levin, supra
note 28, §§ 17-27; Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 4-10. PTSD can also be characterized as
having a delayed onset in that the disorder need not arise immediately after the event. DSM-
1V-TR, supra note 26; see BAKER & ALFONSO, supra note 26; Levin, supra note 28, §§
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In addition, there are a number of specific symptoms that are associated
with a diagnosis of PTSD, including sleep problems, hypervigilance,
exaggerated startle response, irritability, outbursts of anger, difficulty
concentrating, difficulty completing tasks, "flashbacks" that involve
reliving the traumatic event, impulsive behavior, and, in some cases,
psychotic behavior. 138 In recognizing that PTSD is a serious clinical
disorder with symptoms that alter behavior and judgment, the DSM
classifies it as an Axis I disorder along with illnesses including depression,
schizophrenia, and other major mental disorders. 139 Furthermore, the ABA
considers all Axis I disorders to be severe mental disorders that alter
behavior and judgment to the degree that persons who suffer from such
disorders should be exempt from the death penalty. 140
Because PTSD alters behavior and judgment, a diagnosis has mitigating
value since its symptoms affect "the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law."'141 For a combat veteran, the effects of PTSD are
significant and the introduction of the existence of PTSD at the time of the
offense through either a prior or forensic diagnosis should cause a sentencer
to recognize the special mitigating nature of this evidence and spare the
combat veteran's life.142
C. Traumatic Brain Injury
Traumatic brain injuries are neither uncommon nor insignificant. In fact,
more than ninety thousand people a year suffer severe and debilitating brain
injuries in the United States. 143 While TBIs in the United States are already
numerous, there has been a marked increase in the number of TBIs in
combat veterans as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the
past seven years.'4 In light of this recent increase in the incidence of brain
injury in combat veterans, TBI has become a key issue in both the guilt and
17-27; Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 4-10; Bowe, supra note 13, at 33 (stating that one in
three cases of PTSD may be delayed).
138. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26; Levin, supra note 28, § 22; Motherway, supra note
26, § 4. PTSD has also been linked to behaviors that involve substance abuse, risky sexual
habits, and physical abuse. See Kelly Kennedy, Links Between PTSD, Substance Abuse
Explored, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/
2009/01 /military-substanceabuse-ptsd_0 10809w/.
139. See FIRST ET AL., supra note 25; PsychNet-UK, supra note 25 (explaining what
defines and distinguishes different Axis categories in the DSM-IV).
140. ABA Report, supra note 3, at 668, 670-71.
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (alteration in
original); see BAKER& ALFONSO, supra note 26; Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 4-10.
142. See Johnson v. Singletary, 612 So. 2d 575, 579-80 (Fla. 1993); BAKER & ALFONSO,
supra note 26; Levin, supra note 28, §§ 17-27; Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 4-10.
143. William J. Winslade, Traumatic Brain Injury and Criminal Responsibility, MED.
ETHics, Fall 2003, at 2, 4.
144. See Alvarez, supra note 15; Tyson, supra note 15; Memorandum from Jonathan B.
Perlin, Undersecretary for Health, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, to Dep't of Veterans Affairs
Primary Care Clinicians, Screening and Clinical Management of Traumatic Brain Injury I
(Jan. 25, 2006) [hereinafter VA TBI Memo] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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sentencing phases of murder trials involving combat veterans as
defendants. 14
5
There are a number of reasons that explain why TBIs are so common in
combat veterans to have become known as the "signature wound" of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 146 First, the use of IEDs is one of the
preferred methods employed by insurgents to attack and kill American
forces. 147 These explosions cause concussive blasts that emit shock waves
that often result in unconsciousness, disorientation, and other injuries in
soldiers. 148
Many soldiers would have died as a result of these blasts in past
conflicts. 149 However, advances in vehicle armor, helmets, body armor,
and medical treatment on the battlefield have resulted in many more
soldiers surviving their injuries and returning to society. 150 In light of these
factors, it is now estimated that more than three hundred thousand combat
veterans have survived and suffer from some form of TBI as a result of the
war on terror. 151
For those soldiers who survive combat actions that cause head injuries, it
is difficult to diagnose specifically the existence of a TBI.152 As opposed to
an illness like PTSD, which uses the DSM criteria to make a diagnosis,' 53
there are no universal definitions or evidence-based guidelines available to
145. See Kelly Kennedy, Traumatic Brain Injury: Common Wound of War, MARINE
CORPS TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/08/marine
brainmain_070828/ (discussing the increase in the TBI diagnosis in veterans); The Cases,
supra note 20 (providing examples of 121 veterans who have been charged with committing
murders since returning from war).
146. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 15; Tyson, supra note 15.
147. See, e.g., Glasser, supra note 16.
148. See id. Consider the following explanation regarding the danger of improvised
explosive device (IED) blasts:
Here's why IEDS carry such hidden danger. The detonation of any powerful
explosive generates a blast wave of high pressure that spreads out at 1,600 feet per
second from the point of explosion and travels hundreds of yards. The lethal blast
wave is a two-part assault that rattles the brain against the skull. The initial shock
wave of very high pressure is followed closely by the "secondary wind": a huge
volume of displaced air flooding back into the area, again under high pressure. No
helmet or armor can defend against such a massive wave front.
It is these sudden and extreme differences in pressure-routinely 1,000 times
greater than atmospheric pressure-that lead to significant neurological injury.
Id.
149. See id.
150. See Hoge et al., supra note 17, at 454 ("Because of improved protective equipment,
a higher percentage of soldiers are surviving injuries that would have been fatal in previous
wars." (citing Susan Okie, Traumatic Brain Injury in the War Zone, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED.
2043, 2045 (2005)); Glasser, supra note 16. The wounded-to-killed ratio in Vietnam was 2.6
wounded for each person killed. In the war on terrorism, it is sixteen wounded for each
person killed. See Glasser, supra note 16.
151. See Alvarez, supra note 15; Tyson, supra note 15.
152. See Kennedy, supra note 17; VA TBI Memo, supra note 144, at 1-3.
153. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26; BAKER & ALFONSO, supra note 26; Levin, supra
note 28, § 20; Motherway, supra note 26, §§ 4-10.
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diagnose TBI in a combat veteran. 154 The existence of different forms of
TBI, such as mild and moderate forms of TBI, adds to the diagnostic
difficulties because it is believed that minor concussions, which do not
result in unconsciousness or other outward symptoms, can cause delayed
and severe symptoms that are not apparent for months after the injury. 155
Since medical experts generally define TBI as a blow or jolt to the head
that disrupts the functioning of the brain, a diagnosis is currently only
possible through an intensive mental and physical examination by medical
professionals to determine if there has been a disruption in the functioning
of the brain. 156 Diagnosing a less severe form of TBI is more difficult
because the injury is often undetectable in scans of the brain, the symptoms
often mirror those of PTSD, and complaints range from passing headaches
to mild seizures. 157 Although TBI may be difficult to diagnose, there is an
overall consensus within the medical community regarding the symptoms
exhibited by those who have suffered a TBI. 58
Those afflicted with TBI exhibit symptoms that include:
* "Headaches, sleep disturbances, and sensitivity to light and
noise .... "159
* Cognitive symptoms in the form of "disturbances in
attention, memory, or language, as well as delayed reaction
time during problem solving" as "diagnosed on mental-
154. See Kennedy, supra note 17; VA TBI Memo, supra note 144, at 2. The federal
government has defined traumatic brain injury for the purposes of educational disabilities as
an acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force, resulting in
total or partial functional disability or psychosocial impairment, or both, that
adversely affects a child's educational performance. Traumatic brain injury
applies to open or closed head injuries resulting in impairments in one or more
areas, such as cognition; language; memory; attention; reasoning; abstract
thinking; judgment; problem-solving; sensory, perceptual, and motor abilities;
psychosocial behavior; physical functions; information processing; and speech.
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(12) (2008).
155. See Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 372-73; Bruce H. Stern, Representing the
Mildly Brain-Injured Client, TRIAL, Sept. 2000, at 48, 48-50; Robina Riccitiello, Iraq: A
Marine's Experience of Brain Injury, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/l1882164/site/newsweek/print/l/displaymode/1098/; VA TBI Memo, supra
note 144, at 1-3.
156. See Stern, supra note 155, at 48-50; Kennedy, supra note 17; VA TBI Memo, supra
note 144, at 1-3.
157. See Richard A. Bryant, Editorial, Disentangling Mild Traumatic Brain Injury and
Stress Reactions, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 525, 525 (2008) ("[Mild TBI] symptoms can
include problems with memory, balance, and concentration, as well as ringing in the ears,
sensitivity to light or sound, and irritability."); Stern, supra note 155, at 48-50; Kennedy,
supra note 17 ("'Mild' is a misnomer because it can mean anything from a Marine who
bangs his head but has nothing more than a passing headache, to [a Marine] who bangs his
head and has headaches, permanent short-term memory loss and mild seizures.").
158. See Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 371-73; Stern, supra note 155, at 48-49; VA
TBI Memo, supra note 144, at 1-3.
159. Okie, supra note 150, at 2045.
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status examination or through neuropsychological
testing."160
* Behavioral symptoms in the form of "mood changes,
depression, anxiety, impulsiveness, emotional outbursts, or
inappropriate laughter."161
* "Common behavioral deficits includ[ing] decreased ability
to initiate responses, verbal and physical aggression,
agitation, learning difficulties, shallow self-awareness,
altered sexual functioning, impulsivity, and social
disinhibition .... ,,162
* "[E]motional disturbances and personality changes...
leading to alterations in the individual's ability to make
decisions, plan, focus, make selections and self-monitoring
of their own performance.' 63
* "[D]eficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning, such as
agnosia (failure to recognize or identify objects) and
disturbances in executive functioning connected with
planning, organizing, sequencing, and abstracting."'164
These symptoms, and numerous studies about the effect of brain injuries on
behavior, all establish that there is a link between TBIs and an inability to
conform one's behavior to society's expectations and the law. 165
When mitigating evidence of a diagnosis of TBI in an offender is
properly admitted through expert medical testimony and results of
diagnostic testing, there is great value since TBI and its symptoms affect
"the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." 66
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the mitigating nature of
deficiencies in cognitive, behavioral, and emotional abilities in stating that
"[e]vidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning is obviously
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2045-46.
162. Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 5, Leonard v. Simpson, 128 S. Ct. 24 (2007) (No. 06-1317), 2007 WL 1319342
(quoting NIH Consensus Development Panel, Rehabilitation of Persons with Traumatic
Brain Injury, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 974, 976 (1999)).
163. Bitz & Bitz, supra note 28, at 232 (citing Donald T Stuss & Catherine A. Gow,
"Frontal Dysfunction" After Traumatic Brain Injury, NEUROPSYCHIATRY,
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. NEUROLOGY 272, 273 (1992)).
164. ABA Report, supra note 3, at 669-70 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 26, at 135)
(describing symptoms of dementia).
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Bitz & Bitz,
supra note 28, at 230-35; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 372-73; see also VA TBI Memo,
supra note 144, at 1-3.
166. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (alteration in
original); see Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al., supra note 162, at 9-20;
Bitz & Bitz, supra note 28, at 230-34.
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evidence that might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death."'167 For
a combat veteran, the effects of TBI are significant, and the introduction of
the existence of TBI at the time of the offense through either a prior or
forensic diagnosis should cause a sentencer to recognize the unique
mitigating nature of this evidence and spare the combat veteran's life. 168
III. ARGUING FOR LIFE BY PROPOSING A CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION
Ideally, mitigating evidence would ensure that the death penalty was only
imposed on those offenders who are 'the most deserving of execution.' 1 69
Unfortunately, the discretion of judges has proven over time that certain
offenders have been sentenced to death despite evidence of impairments in
intellectual and mental functioning. 170 To guard against this danger, the
Supreme Court created specific categorical exclusions that put certain
classes of offenders, such as the mentally retarded and juveniles, outside the
reach of the death penalty as a matter of law. 17 1
A. Justification for and Criticisms of Categorical Exclusions
Categorical exclusions are necessary because sentencers may not, in their
own discretionary role, give effect to some forms of mitigating evidence
regarding certain offenders. 172 Mitigating evidence of mental health issues
should evoke sympathy and explain why a capital defendant is not among
"'the most deserving of execution." ' 173 Yet, all too often, sentencers
construe the mitigating nature of mental health issues as a factor in
aggravation because it also speaks to future dangerousness and lack of
rehabilitative potential.' 74 Thus, mitigating evidence of mental health
167. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288 (2004) (quoting Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. See Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al., supra note 162, at 9-20;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Bitz & Bitz, supra note
28, at 230-34.
169. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 319 (2002)); Fabian, supra note 10, at 90; Jochnowitz, supra note 10, at 5; Ryan &
Berson, supra note 3, at 376-77; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1150-51; Tabak, supra note 3, at
288-93.
170. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 558; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309; see also Fabian, supra
note 10, at 90; Jochnowitz, supra note 10, at 5, 9-16; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 376-
77; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1150-51; Tabak, supra note 3, at 288-93.
171. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21.
172. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21; Slobogin, supra note 3, at
1150-51; Tabak, supra note 3, at 288-93.
173. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319); Slobogin, supra note
3, at 1150-51; Tabak, supra note 3, at 288-93.
174. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21; Fabian, supra note 10, at 90;
Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 376-77; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1150-51; Tabak, supra
note 3, at 288.
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issues functions as a double-edged sword that can cut both ways to both
help and hurt a defendant's plea to be given a sentence of less than death. 175
An additional justification for having categorical exclusions is that
mitigating evidence based on psychology or psychiatry is undervalued and
often misunderstood by sentencers. 176 It is understandable that skepticism
exists when a psychiatrist or psychologist attempts to advance a unique
expert opinion regarding behavior in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial. 177 However, when judges properly serve as the evidentiary gatekeeper
in a Daubert inquiry, 178 they ensure that junk science and untested theories
do not enter the courtroom; rather, only diagnoses based on accepted
medical theories and diseases should be admitted. 179  In those
circumstances where it is established that a valid mental health issue existed
at the time of the offense based on expert testimony, 180 a categorical
exclusion precludes the sentencer from devaluing and discounting that
mitigating factor to assess a sentence of death where it is unwarranted. 181
Categorical exclusions based on the existence of certain characteristics,
such as mental retardation, mental illness, or being a juvenile, may protect
defined classes of offenders from being put to death, but these exclusions
also inspire criticism from many fronts. A number of death penalty
abolitionists dislike categorical exclusions because they acknowledge that
some offenders deserve to die for their crimes. 182 Some critics argue that
175. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21; Fabian, supra note 10, at
90; Jochnowitz, supra note 10, at 14; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 376-77; Slobogin,
supra note 3, at 1150-51; Tabak, supra note 3, at 288-93.
176. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79; Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288-89 (2004);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21; Fabian, supra note 10, at 90; Jochnowitz, supra note 10, at 5;
Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 376-77.
177. See Fabian, supra note 10, at 90; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 376-77.
178. E.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993)
(describing several factors federal courts must review when performing "a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue").
179. See, e.g., Bado-Santana v. Ford Motor Co., 482 F. Supp. 2d 192, 193-97 (D.P.R.
2007).
180. Interesting issues are presented regarding who should determine whether an offender
meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion. Is it an issue of law for the judge to decide
after weighing expert testimony? Or, is it an issue of fact for a jury to determine after
hearing differing expert testimony? Such questions are worthy of further examination but
are beyond the scope of this Essay. See Nava Feldman, Annotation, Application of
Constitutional Rule of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335
(2002), that Execution of Mentally Retarded Persons Constitutes "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment" in Violation of Eighth Amendment, 122 A.L.R.5TH 145 (2004).
181. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21; Fabian, supra note 10, at
90; Jochnowitz, supra note 10, at 9-16; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 376-77; Slobogin,
supra note 3, at 1150-51; Tabak, supra note 3, at 290-93.
182. See Klein, supra note 3, at 1259 ("The Court in both Roper and Atkins seems to have
forgotten, however, about the Eighth Amendment rights of those who are still subject to the
death penalty, and also about its own prior commitment to the Eighth Amendment principle
that capital punishment must be imposed fairly and consistently or not at all."); Ryan &
Berson, supra note 3, at 359-60 (discussing arguments about categorical exclusions for the
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categorical exclusions are out of step with the death penalty jurisprudence
that has developed because they substitute legal exclusions for measured
assessments of individualized culpability by sentencers. 183 Other critics
point to the practical definitional difficulties in establishing standards and
criteria for classifying an offender as part of the protected class. 184
While one commentator has referred to the recent establishment of
categorical exclusions as akin to the opening up of "a psychiatric can of
worms," 185 the Supreme Court applied a clear framework for analyzing
whether to adopt a categorical exclusion in the cases of Atkins v. Virginia
and Roper v. Simmons. 186 The ABA has already argued for extending the
categorical exclusion framework to include those with severe mental
disorders and TBIs that significantly impair the capacity of an offender "(a)
to appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b)
to exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law."' 8 7 This recommendation has been
criticized for being overly broad. 188 But, within the ABA recommendations
and the categorical exclusion framework applied in Atkins and Roper,189 it
is clear that a narrow categorical exclusion should exist for combat veterans
who were suffering, at the time of their offense, from service-related PTSD
or TBI.
B. Atkins and Roper Framework for Recognizing a Categorical Exclusion
In 1980, Johnny Paul Penry, a mentally retarded murderer, was sentenced
to death in Texas for raping and killing Pamela Carpenter. 190 In 1986,
Georgia executed Jerome Bowden, another mentally retarded murderer. 191
mentally ill and the dilemmas created by "'incremental abolition' of the death penalty
(quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353)); Shin, supra note 3, at 516 ("[fln the long run, advocating
for the categorical exemption may be counterproductive to [the abolitionist] goal of
eradicating the [death] penalty in this country.").
183. See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (2006); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433, 443 (1990) ("'[T]he punishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the defendant ... ' (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327 (1989)));
ABA Report, supra note 3, at 668; Klein, supra note 3, at 1258-59 ("Because juvenile and
mentally retarded offenders are not necessarily less culpable, categorically excluding them
from capital punishment results in unjust treatment for similarly culpable non-juvenile and
non-mentally retarded offenders."); Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1147-50 (discussing and
addressing arguments against a categorical exclusion for those with severe mental illnesses).
184. See Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 355 (citing AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS (2006), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/003/2006) (discussing the failure of the
Supreme Court to specify standards or procedures for determining if a person is competent
or suffering from mental illness).
185. See, e.g., Mossman, supra note 3.
186. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21; infra Part III.B.
187. ABA Report, supra note 3, at 668, 670.
188. See Mossman, supra note 3, at 289-91; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 381.
189. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-21; ABA Report, supra note
3, at 668.
190. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307-10 (1989); Mossman, supra note 3, at 257.
191. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 n.8.
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The execution of Bowden apparently caused the federal government and the
states of Maryland and Georgia to pass statutes that prohibited the
execution of those who are mentally retarded. 192 Penry used these statutes
on appeal to argue that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 193
requires a categorical exclusion from execution for the mentally retarded
because such a punishment is cruel and unusual. 194
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in Penry v. Lynaugh,195 rejected his
argument for a categorical exclusion, refusing to exempt mentally retarded
offenders from being subject to the death penalty as a matter of law under
the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment. 196 On the same day as deciding
Penry, the Court also examined the propriety of imposing the death penalty
on juvenile offenders in Stanford v. Kentucky, 197 holding that the Eighth
Amendment did not bar the imposition of the death penalty on offenders
who were older than fifteen but younger than eighteen years of age. 198
Although rejecting the arguments for categorical exclusions in both cases,
the Court in its analyses clarified the factors and considerations inherent in
determining if executing a given class of offenders violates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 199
It was not until Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons that the Court
had the opportunity to once again examine adopting a categorical exclusion
for a given class of offenders. In 2002, the Court held in Atkins that it was
unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on mentally retarded
persons.200 In 2005, the Court held in Roper that it was unconstitutional to
impose the death penalty upon juvenile offenders. 20 1 The Court employed a
two-step analysis for determining whether the death penalty is an acceptable
punishment for certain classes of offenders under the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.20 2 In the first part of this
192. See, e.g., Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1967
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2006)); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-61 (Supp.
2008); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2008); see also Atkins, 536
U.S. at 313-14;Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
193. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
194. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328-29, 333-34; Mossman, supra note 3, at 257-58.
195. 492 U.S. 302.
196. Id. at 328-30, 339-40 ("In sum, mental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a
defendant's culpability for a capital offense. But we cannot conclude today that the Eighth
Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability
convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone."); see
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07, 313-15; Mossman, supra note 3, at 255, 257-59; Ryan &
Berson, supra note 3, at 355.
197. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-75 (2005).
198. Id. at 380; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 355.
199. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328-40; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368-80; see Mossman, supra note
3, at 257-59.
200. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; see Mossman, supra note 3, at 261-63; Ryan & Berson,
supra note 3, at 355; Shin, supra note 3, at 481.
201. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574-75; see Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 355; Shin, supra
note 3, at 487.
202. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21; see Shin, supra note 3, at
477-81,483-87.
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analysis, the Court attempted to determine whether putting to death certain
offenders constitutes punishment that is "'graduated and proportioned to
[the] offense"' 20 3 and within the boundaries of the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 204
In assessing whether the death penalty is appropriate for certain classes
of offenders and reflective of "evolving standards of decency," 20 5 the Court
first examined "objective evidence of contemporary values" 20 6 and other
evidence that serves as "'a significant and reliable objective index' of
societal mores." 207 The Court held that the clearest objective evidence is to
be found in "the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." 20 8 The
Court additionally looked to "data reflecting the actions of sentencing
juries" as indicia of a national consensus against putting to death certain
classes of offenders. 209 National consensus about contemporary values and
standards of decency was also ascertained from the views of professional
organizations, religious groups, and opinion polls.2 10 While there is much
disagreement about relying on international opinion to define American
standards of decency, the Court acknowledged that world opinion can
"provide respected and significant confirmation for [its] own conclusions"
when seeking to determine if the death penalty is a disproportionate
punishment for a given category of offenders. 211
Objective evidence of contemporary values and societal mores is
important but did not dictate in Atkins and Roper whether or not a class of
offenders should be exempt from the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. 212 The second part of the analysis required that the Supreme
Court "determine, in the exercise of [its] own independent judgment,
whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for [a class of
203. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311); see also Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); Shin, supra note 3, at 477-78.
204. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
205. Roper, 543 U.S. at 594 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
206. Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
207. Roper, 543 U.S. at 90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion)); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323 (same).
208. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331); see also id. at 324
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Shin, supra note 3, at 477-79, 483-85.
209. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 590 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at
596).
210. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. But see id. at 325-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
Shin, supra note 3, at 479.
211. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-79; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; id. at 324-28
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that data gathered by professional and religious
organizations should not be given any weight in the Eighth Amendment analysis); Shin,
supra note 3, at 479, 486-87.




offenders]. '213 This second step allowed the Court to weigh in with its own
judgment and consider subjective factors, such as the penological goals of
punishment, specific mitigating factors that may entitle a class of offenders
to a categorical exclusion, and whether or not there is an unacceptable
likelihood that a sentencer could disregard those mitigating factors to still
arrive at a sentence of death. 214
1. Defining a Categorical Exclusion for the Mentally Retarded
in Atkins v. Virginia
Daryl Renard Atkins was sentenced to death in Virginia for the 1996
murder of Eric Nesbitt. 215 In the Supreme Court of Virginia, he challenged
his sentence on the grounds that he was "'mentally retarded and thus [could
not] be sentenced to death."'' 216 In a divided opinion, a majority of the
court relied upon Penry v. Lynaugh to hold that a mentally retarded person
can be sentenced to death. 217 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address "the gravity of the concerns expressed by the dissenters" from the
Supreme Court of Virginia and revisit the issue in Penry regarding the
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty upon mentally incompetent
adults.218
In deciding Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
mentally retarded should not be subject to execution because, "[i]f the
culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most
extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally
retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. ' 219 The
Court held that the mentally retarded are entitled to a categorical exclusion
from the death penalty because of the national consensus that had
developed regarding the "relative culpability of mentally retarded
offenders," the lack of satisfaction of the "penological" goals of the death
penalty in executing the mentally retarded, the mitigating nature of the
characteristics of mental retardation, and the "risk 'that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty.' "220
213. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13; Shin, supra note 3, at 478,
480-81,485-87.
214. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-79; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13; Shin, supra note 3,
at 478-81, 484-87.
215. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
216. Id. at 310 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (Va. 2000)); see
Mossman, supra note 3, at 261.
217. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 319; see Mossman, supra note 3, at 261.
218. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310; see Mossman, supra note 3, at 261; Shin, supra note 3, at
477.
219. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; see Klein, supra note 3, at 1219-28; Ryan & Berson, supra
note 3, at 357-58; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3, at 480-81.
220. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978));
see Mossman, supra note 3, at 262-63; Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 357-58; Slobogin,
supra note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3, at 478-81.
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First, the Court determined that objective indicia of contemporary values
and societal mores reflected a discomfort with and intolerance for the
execution of the mentally retarded. 221 The Court found that, in the years
since Penry v. Lynaugh, a national consensus had developed based on the
actions of legislatures that "unquestionably reflect[ed] widespread judgment
about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the
relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes
served by the death penalty. '222
After determining that the objective evidence indicated that there was a
national consensus against the imposition of the death penalty on the
mentally retarded, the Court moved onto the second step of the analysis and
examined the issue using its own independent judgment. 223 It examined the
penological goals of the death penalty and found that neither deterrence nor
retribution was advanced by executing the mentally retarded. 224 The Court
held that the retributive purpose of the death penalty was not served
because, if execution was an improper punishment for the average offender,
it was most certainly improper in the case of a mentally retarded person.225
The Court also reasoned that the deterrent purposes of the death penalty
were not advanced because it is "less likely that [the mentally retarded] can
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a
result, control their conduct based upon that information." 226
The Court also assessed how the characteristics of mental retardation
served as mitigating factors and found that the mentally retarded "by
definition . . . have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others."227 In addition, the Court found that
there was an unacceptable risk that evidence of mental retardation presented
in mitigation could be construed by a sentencer as a factor in aggravation in
spite of the fact that it should call for a penalty less severe than death. 228
221. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17; Mossman, supra note 3, at 262; Shin, supra note 3,
at 478-80.
222. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; see Mossman, supra note 3, at 262-63; Shin, supra note 3,
at 478-80.
223. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21; Shin, supra note 3, at 480-81.
224. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3,
at 480-8 1.
225. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3, at
480.
226. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3, at
480.
227. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 18; see Klein, supra note 3, at 1223-28; Mossman, supra note 3,
at 262; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3, at 480.
228. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21; Shin, supra note 3, at 481.
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2. Defining a Categorical Exclusion for Juveniles in Roper v. Simmons
Christopher Simmons was a seventeen-year-old junior in high school
when he murdered Shirley Crook by kidnapping her, tying her up, and
throwing her from a bridge so that she would drown. 229 In the Missouri
state courts, he was tried as an adult and sentenced to death.230 Subsequent
to being denied postconviction relief in both state and federal courts, the
U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Atkins, holding that the mentally
retarded could not be sentenced to death.231 Simmons then sought relief
from the Missouri Supreme Court, "arguing that the reasoning of Atkins
established that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a juvenile
who was under eighteen when the crime was committed. '232 The Missouri
Supreme Court agreed with his rationale and set aside the death sentence. 233
The state appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 234
In Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juveniles should
not be subject to execution because their "objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less
severe than death. '235 The Court held that juveniles were entitled to a
categorical exclusion from the death penalty because objective indicia
provide evidence that juveniles are categorically less culpable than the
average criminal; the penological goals of the death penalty regarding
deterrence and retribution are not served by executing juveniles; the
characteristics of being a juvenile have mitigating qualities; and there is an
unacceptable risk of a sentencer disregarding mitigating arguments based
on youth and imposing the death penalty where a sentence less severe than
death is appropriate. 236
In seeking to determine whether or not there was a national consensus
against the execution of juveniles, the Court recognized that there was a
consensus, but there was no clear objective evidence of legislative action by
the states as there was in Atkins.237 Lacking clear evidence of legislative
action, the Court instead recognized a "trend toward abolition of the
juvenile death penalty [that] carries special force in light of the general
popularity of anticrime legislation" in the nation's state legislatures.238
This national consensus, the Court claimed, could be observed in "the
objective indicia of consensus in this case-the rejection of the juvenile
death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even
229. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005); Shin, supra note 3, at 482.
230. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557-58; Shin, supra note 3, at 482-83.
231. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
232. Id.; see Shin, supra note 3, at 482-83.
233. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559-60; Shin, supra note 3, at 483.
234. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
235. Id. at 573; Shin, supra note 3, at 484-87.
236. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 566-75; Klein, supra note 3, at 1228-29; Slobogin, supra
note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3, at 484-87.
237. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Klein, supra note 3, at 1228.
238. Roper, 543 U.S. at 566; see Shin, supra note 3, at 484-85.
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where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward
abolition of the practice." 239
When the Court applied its own independent judgment in Roper, it came
to conclusions that were similar to those it reached in Atkins. 240 The Court
found that the retributive goals of the death penalty were not advanced by
executing juveniles because the most severe penalty under the law should
not be "imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity. '241
The Court also found that the deterrent purposes of the death penalty were
not served by executing juveniles because "the same characteristics that
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will
be less susceptible to deterrence." 242
Additionally, the Court examined how the characteristics of juveniles
served as mitigating factors and found that "[t]hree general differences
between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. '243
Specifically, the Court found that (1) juveniles "lack . . . maturity and
[have] an underdeveloped sense of responsibility" that often results "in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions"; 244 (2) "juveniles are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure"; 245 and (3) "the character of a juvenile is not as
well formed as that of an adult."'246 Based on these mitigating factors, the
Court reasoned that a juvenile should never be characterized as among the
worst offenders because the factors indicate that juveniles may "be forgiven
for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment,"
juveniles are still developing their character and may not be irretrievably
depraved, and there is a greater possibility "that a minor's character
deficiencies will be reformed" as compared to an adult offender. 247
Finally, the Court found that there was an unacceptable risk that a
sentencer would disregard mitigating arguments based on youth and impose
the death penalty. 248 In recognizing that individualized consideration of
mitigating circumstances was not enough to prevent juveniles from being
sentenced to death, the Court found "that the brutality or cold-blooded
nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective
239. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567; see Shin, supra note 3, at 484-85.
240. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-79; Klein, supra note 3, at 1228.
241. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; see Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1140; Shin, supra note 3, at
486.
242. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Shin, supra note 3, at 486 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571).
243. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Shin, supra note 3, at 485.
244. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); Shin, supra note 3, at
485 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
246. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; Shin, supra note 3, at 485-86.
247. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; see Shin, supra note 3, at 485-86.
248. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73; Shin, supra note 3, at 486.
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immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a
sentence less severe than death. 249
C. Narrow Categorical Exclusion for Certain Combat Veterans
Based on the rationales of Atkins and Roper, there should be a narrow
categorical exclusion for combat veterans who were suffering at the time of
their offense from service-related PTSD or TBI. This categorical exclusion
would reflect the national consensus that has developed regarding the
impropriety of putting to death this class of offenders; recognize that the
penological goals of the death penalty are not served by executing these
offenders; acknowledge the significant mitigating nature of PTSD and TBI
in combat veterans who have also been trained to kill by the government;
and address the unacceptable risk that a sentencer could disregard
mitigating evidence of military training, PTSD, and TBI to impose a death
sentence where it is unwarranted. Such a categorical exclusion will not
excuse the actions of those who commit capital offenses, but will merely
limit their punishment to a term of years or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
1. Defining the Proposed Categorical Exclusion
Some critics of categorical exclusions point to definitional difficulties in
opposing the creation of classes of offenders that are exempt from the death
penalty as a matter of law.250 A categorical exclusion for combat veterans
with service-related PTSD or TBI would pose some definitional problems,
but it is possible to clearly define the requirements for who should and
should not be included in the proposed class.
First, one meets the criteria for being a combat veteran only if he or she
has taken fire from or fired at an enemy force while serving in the armed
forces. 251 Enemy fire should include both direct fire, such as bullets from
rifles and pistols, and indirect fire, such as mortars, rockets, and artillery. 252
As with mental retardation, the burden of proving this point should be on
249. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; see Shin, supra note 3, at 486.
250. See Ryan & Berson, supra note 3, at 355.
251. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION No. 1650.1G,
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AWARDS MANUAL 2-27 to 2-29 (2002); Monique Randolph,
Airmen Receive First AF Combat Action Medals, AIR FORCE LINK, June 12, 2007,
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123056767; U.S. Army, Combat Action Badge,
http://www.army.mil/symbols/combatbadges/Action.html?storyid-key=7285 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
252. See Randolph, supra note 251 (describing the creation of the Air Force Combat
Action Medal, which was "created to recognize Air Force members who were engaged in air
or ground combat off base in a combat zone.... [or] were under direct and hostile fire, or
who personally engaged hostile forces with direct and lethal fire"); U.S. Army, supra note
251 (specifying that soldiers are eligible for a combat action badge if they have "perform[ed]
assigned duties in an area where hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay is authorized"). See
generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, supra note 251 (describing active engagement of fire as
a requirement to receiving certain award medals and honors).
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the person attempting to assert that they are part of the proposed class. 2 53
Military records, eyewitness testimony, and news reports could all be relied
upon by a combat veteran to establish that one was exposed to enemy fire
or took part in shooting at the enemy.
Second, it would be required that a combat veteran be suffering from a
diagnosis of PTSD or TBI at the time of his or her offense.254 The defense
would have the burden of proving that a combat veteran was suffering from
PTSD or TBI at the time of the offense.255 Additionally, any prior or
forensic diagnosis of PTSD or TBI should be based on a medical evaluation
using the DSM criteria for PTSD and the diagnostic criteria accepted within
the medical community for determining the existence of a TBI. 256
Finally, for a diagnosis of PTSD or TBI to be considered service-related,
some aspect of military service must be the primary cause of the injury in
the opinion of a medical expert. 257 There can be preexisting or other causal
factors at play in a diagnosis of PTSD or TBI. 258 But, for it to be
considered service-related where there are other causes, the medical expert
examining and diagnosing the combat veteran must find that the primary
cause of the PTSD or TBI is related to military service. 259  This
determination is not difficult to make, and the current U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs disability rating process already provides an existing
method that may easily be adopted by the courts.260
2. Objective Evidence of Contemporary Values and Societal Mores
Objective indicia of societal mores and contemporary values support the
adoption of a categorical exclusion from the death penalty for combat
veterans who commit capital crimes while suffering from service-related
PTSD or TBI. Much like the situation in Roper v. Simmons, where there
was a lack of explicit legislative action with regard to executing juveniles,
253. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part II.B-C (defining and discussing PTSD and TBI).
255. See supra Part II.B-C (discussing diagnoses for PTSD and TBI). It is important
that one allow for a forensic diagnosis in light of the fact that there are barriers to care and a
stigma attached to seeking out mental health issues as a result of military service. See Hoge
et al., supra note 13, at 13 ("Our findings indicate that among the study groups there was a
significant risk of mental health problems and that the subjects reported important barriers to
receiving mental health services, particularly the perception of stigma among those most in
need of such care.").
256. See supra Part II.B-C.
257. See U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, VA Health Care Eligibility & Enrollment,
http://www.va.gov/healtheligibility/Library/Glossary/#s (last visited Mar. 31, 2009)
("Generally a service-connected disability is a disability that VA determines was incurred or
aggravated while on active duty in the military and in the line of duty. A service-connected
rating is an official ruling by VA that your illness/condition is directly related to your active
military service. Service-connected ratings are established by VA Regional Offices located
throughout the country.").
258. See supra Part II.B-C.
259. See supra note 257.
260. See supra note 257.
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there is little evidence regarding executing combat veterans in the
expression of the country's legislatures. 261  However, there is a trend
evidenced in the actions of at least three state legislatures-California,
Minnesota, and Connecticut-and four cities-Anchorage, Alaska; Tulsa,
Oklahoma; Edwardsville, Illinois; and Buffalo, New York-in treating
combat veterans differently when they commit crimes through diversion
programs and "veterans courts" that recognize their diminished culpability
relative to the average offender.262 Two other states, Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, have initiated community-based programs to deal with
veterans with PTSD in the criminal justice system. 263 These legislative
actions are important and carry "special force in light of the general
popularity of anticrime legislation. '" 264
Public opinion and legislative action in support of veterans who suffer
from PTSD and TBI also present objective evidence of a national consensus
that supports recognizing combat veterans as a distinct and unique group
worthy of special treatment by the government and under the law. 265 From
magnetic yellow ribbons on cars to broad campaign promises to take care of
our veterans, it appears that popular sentiment backing those combat
veterans who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan favors helping them with
any service-related injuries they may have incurred. 266 This sentiment
261. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
262. See Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20; Ruben Rosario, Talk
Doesn't Mean Action for Vets, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul, Minn.), Apr. 27, 2008, at B 1;
Alaskan City Establishes Diversion Court for Veterans, JOIN TOGETHER, July 15, 2004,
http://www.jointogether.org/news/headlines/inthenews/2004/alaskan-city-establishes-for.html;
Conn. Bill Creates Criminal Docket for Vets, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009,
http://www.marinecorpstimes.corn/news/2009/02/apctvets-court_022209/; Shanna McCord,
Boulder Creek Woman Speaks on National Veterans Panel, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, Oct. 31,
2008, http://www.scsextra.com/story.php?sid=80753&storySection Local&fromSearch=
true&searchTerms (discussing the California Assembly Bill 2586, which provides for
alternative sentences for veterans involved in drug, alcohol, and other minor offenses);
Michelle Rabinowitz & Sway Calloway, Veterans Fight for an Alternative Justice System
that Takes Their Trauma into Account: Former Marines in Oklahoma Help Set Up a System
to Provide Treatment for Vets Arrested for Drug- and Alcohol-Related Crimes, MTV.COM,
Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1597696/20081022/story.jhtml; Jim Suhr,
Another Veterans-Only Court Established, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009,
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/01/apyeterans_court 011209/; Beth Walton,
Crime and PTSD: Pending Legislation Would Help Veterans Get Treatment Instead of
Prison Time, CITYPAGES, Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.citypages.com/2008-03-26/feature/
crime-and-ptsd/. El Paso County, Colorado; Waupaca County, Wisconsin; and Rock
County, Wisconsin also have plans to launch veterans courts in the summer of 2009. See
Dan Wilson, Vets Get Attention from Courts, POST-CRESCENT (Wis.), Feb. 23, 2009, at A3;
Susan Davies, Troop-Related Felonies Expected to Increase, KOAA.COM, Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.koaa.com/aaaa-top-stories/x407184412/Troop-related-felonies-expected-to-
increase.
263. Bowe, supra note 13, at 33-34.
264. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
265. See Shin, supra note 3, at 494-96, 502-04.
266. See, e.g., Matthew J. Friedman, Editorial, Acknowledging the Psychiatric Cost of
War, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 75, 76 (2004) ("Americans no longer confuse war with the
warrior; those returning from Iraq or Afghanistan enjoy national support, despite sharp
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indicates that a significant number of Americans would support, or at least
tolerate, a narrow categorical exclusion from the death penalty for combat
veterans who committed a capital offense while suffering from service-
related PTSD or TBI.
The opinions of professional organizations also serve as objective indicia
that there should be a categorical exclusion for combat veterans who were
suffering from service-related PTSD or TBI at the time of their offenses.267
The ABA recommendations from August 2006 clearly support extending a
categorical exclusion to this class of combat veterans.268 Additionally, the
ABA recommendations have also been endorsed by the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, and the
National Alliance of the Mentally 111.269 The support of these professional
organizations indicates that there is a national consensus behind treating
combat veterans with service-related PTSD or TBI differently under the law
and recognizing that they have diminished culpability relative to the
average offender.270
political disagreement about the war itself."); Rosario, supra note 262; Sontag & Alvarez,
Combat Trauma, supra note 20; Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Fact
Sheet: President Bush Has Provided Unprecedented Support for Our Veterans (Nov. 7,
2008), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/1 I/
20081107-5.html ("'We have a moral obligation to provide the best possible care and
treatment to the men and women who have served our country."' (quoting President George
W. Bush)); Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, A Year After the
Walter Reed Scandal: Public Continues to Fault Government for Troop Care (Mar. 19,
2008), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/404.pdf ("A year after the problems at
Walter Reed Army Medical Center and other military hospitals made major news, the public
remains highly critical of the government's performance in supporting and caring for
soldiers who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan."); Americans Believe Wounded Iraq
War Veterans Are Not Receiving High Quality Medical Care When They Return to the U.S.,
HARRIS INTERACTIVE, May 25, 2008, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.
asp?NewslD=1309 ("'This new research is consistent with research we recently conducted
with the American Psychiatric Association that found that citizens of all types and political
leanings, service men and women, and their families alike do not believe veterans are able to
access and receive the best mental healthcare possible here in the United States."' (quoting
Humphrey Taylor, chairman of The Harris PolO); Jeffrey M. Jones, Eight in 10 Say Leaders
Pay Too Little Attention to Veterans, GALLUP, Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.gallup.corn/
poll/27310/Eight-Say-Leaders-Pay-Too-Little-Attention-Veterans.aspx ("Eighty-one percent
of Americans say government leaders pay too little attention to the needs of military
veterans, according to the March 26-29 poll."); Kevin Maurer, Mind Training Helps with
Combat, Then PTSD, MARINE CoRPs TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.marinecorpstimes.
com/news/2008/10/ap..warriormind_100708/ ("'At the end of the day, a yellow ribbon
bumper sticker is not going to cut it' ... . 'If this [PTSD treatment] is something that will
help some of our soldiers, we should do it."' (quoting Sarah Ernst, senior Warrior Mind
instructor for the Warrior Mind Training program at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)); Lydia
Saad, Americans Respect the Military, Honor Veterans, GALLUP, Nov. 11, 2002,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/7177/Americans-Respect-Military-Honor-Veterans.aspx ("Nearly
three-quarters (73%) of veterans say they have received the respect and thanks [they]
deserve for serving in the armed forces." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
267. See supra Parts II.B-C, III.A; supra note 210 and accompanying text.
268. See ABA Report, supra note 3, at 668.
269. Id.
270. See id.; supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
2991
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Perhaps the best objective indicia of societal mores is reflected in the
cases that have come up regarding combat veterans who have faced trial for
capital crimes. 271 While it is likely too early to say that the sentencing data
reflects an undeniable trend, sentencing judges do seem to be giving combat
veterans lesser sentences in certain cases in recognition of their reduced
culpability relative to the average offender.27 2 For example, the recent
study of 121 unlawful killings in the United States involving combat
veterans of Iraq or Afghanistan as defendants or perpetrators indicates that
the courts have shown some degree of leniency in a number of cases. 273
Comments from the bench, and even from prosecutors, may indicate a trend
in showing leniency during sentencing and compassion for those combat
veterans who were suffering from PTSD or TBI at the time of their
offense.274
271. See The Cases, supra note 20.
272. For example, Cody Morris, a veteran suffering from PTSD, shot and killed someone
at a house party after returning from Iraq two weeks earlier. See Shelly Byrne, Probation
Considered for Carlisle Veteran: Cody Morris Was Sentenced in July in the Death of His
Friend Casey Hall, PADUCAH SUN (Ky.), Nov. 2, 2008, at IA, available at
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2008/11/02/3753455.htm ("The jury considered murder and
manslaughter charges, but ultimately decided he was guilty of the lesser charge of reckless
homicide."); see also Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20; The Cases, supra
note 20.
273. After claiming that his gun went off accidentally and killed a neighbor, Kenneth
Baginski received a reduced sentence as a result of plea negotiations that took into account
his combat injuries and combat stress. See The Cases, supra note 20. Michael Hulett's
lawyer believed "the judge gave [him] a break on what could have been a more severe
sentence for first-degree murder 'because he was a 19-year-old with an Iraq background."'
Id. Michael Kempton, Jr., was given a lighter sentence for a charge of drunken vehicular
homicide due to his service in Iraq. See id. Anthony Klecker was sentenced to less than a
year in jail for the drunken vehicular homicide of a 16-year-old cheerleader while he was
suffering from PTSD and self-medicating with heavy alcohol usage. See id. David Murphy
was sentenced to probation for the drunken vehicular homicide of two newlyweds in Texas
that occurred soon after his return from Iraq. See id. Matthew Sepi had a murder charge and
an attempted murder charge against him dismissed by a Las Vegas court "after he
successfully completed two Veterans Affairs treatment programs, one for substance abuse
and another for post-traumatic stress disorder." Id. Walter Smith killed his girlfriend and
mother of his twin children after being discharged from the U.S. Marine Corps due to PTSD
and was only sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison after pleading guilty to
manslaughter. See id. Jared Terrasas was allowed to plead guilty to felony child
endangerment instead of murder in the death of his infant son after his return from Iraq. See
id. After deploying twice to Iraq and having previously pleaded no contest to felony child
abuse, Jessie Ullom's son died, and he subsequently pleaded no contest to a charge of
involuntary manslaughter, was placed on probation, and received an honorable discharge
from the U.S. Army. See id.
274. See Deborah Sontag, An Iraq Veteran 's Descent; a Prosecutor's Hard Choice, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at AI ("We looked at this case and said, 'When he presents to a jury
that he served his country like his country asked him to serve, and even his country admits,
with his discharge and his disability pay, that he has severe psychological trauma'-we felt
there was a very good chance that the members of a jury would find him not guilty and
basically punish the government for the position he's in."); Sontag & Alvarez, Combat
Trauma, supra note 20 ("'I see these stickers that people have on their vehicles saying,
"Support the troops."... I don't see much support for the troops as years go on when these
people come back injured and maimed."' (quoting Judge Charles B. Kommann, before he
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3. Applying the Court's Own Judgment to the Proposed Categorical
Exclusion
While these objective indicia of national consensus reflect broad support
for treating combat veterans who were suffering from service-related PTSD
or TBI at the time of their crimes differently under the law, the Supreme
Court will be required to apply its own independent judgment to determine
"whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for [a class of
offenders]. '27 5 The application of the Court's own independent judgment
should lead to conclusions that are similar to those of Atkins v. Virginia and
Roper v. Simmons.2 76
In applying its own judgment and considering subjective factors, the
Court will find that the penological goals of the death penalty are not served
by executing these offenders on many of the same grounds discussed
regarding the mentally retarded in Atkins. 277 The retributive purpose of the
death penalty is not served by executing anyone in this proposed class of
offenders because the diminished culpability of one suffering from PTSD or
TBI certainly does not warrant a death sentence "[i]f the culpability of the
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State." 278 The deterrent goals of the death penalty are not
furthered by executing the proposed category of combat veterans because,
as a result of the judgment-impairing effects of PTSD and TBI at the time
of their crime, it will be "less likely that they [could] process the
information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result,




The Court, in exercising its own independent judgment, should also
undertake an examination of the mitigating characteristics of PTSD and
TBI in combat veterans. 280 By conducting the same sort of examination
that it did in Atkins and Roper, the Court should find that both PTSD and
TBI symptoms significantly affect judgment so as to render combat
veterans suffering from those conditions similar to, if not less culpable than,
the mentally retarded and juveniles. The symptoms of PTSD and TBI are
similar to mental retardation and juvenile status insofar as the ability to
appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct and to conform one's conduct
to the requirements of the law is significantly diminished. The Court
should also examine the role that government-sponsored military training
plays in diminishing culpability in combat veterans, especially those with
PTSD or TBI, to find further support for a categorical exclusion.
sentenced James Allen Gregg, who was found guilty of second-degree murder for a killing
committed while suffering from PTSD)); The Cases, supra note 20.
275. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
318-21 (2002); supra Parts II.B--C, III.A; supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part 111.B.1-2.
277. See supra Part III.B.1.
278. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; see supra Parts II.B-C, III.B.1.
279. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
280. See supra Part II.B-C (describing the mitigating effects of PTSD and TBI).
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Perhaps most importantly, the Court could likely address the
unacceptable risk that a sentencer could disregard mitigating evidence of
military training, PTSD, or TBI offered by a combat veteran who
committed a crime while suffering from service-related PTSD or TBI to
impose a death sentence where it is unwarranted. In assessing the degree of
risk that a sentencer might undervalue or disregard this type of mitigating
evidence, the Court should consider the declining representation of veterans
in the community, in the judiciary, in Congress, and in society as a
whole. 28' Fewer veterans means fewer on the bench and fewer in the jury
box who have a meaningful understanding of what sacrifices these people
made in combat and what they have been exposed to in combat.282 Another
consideration the Court could examine is the considerable risk, already
evidenced by some comments from prosecutors and judges, 28 3 that a
sentencer might treat this evidence of stress disorder or brain injury as
aggravating evidence, seeing a heightened risk to society of permitting a
"crazy, government-trained killer" to live. Should it consider these factors,
the Court will probably conclude that combat veterans who commit capital
crimes, but were also suffering from PTSD or TBI at the time of their
offenses, should be spared the death penalty because of the unacceptable
"risk 'that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty."' 284
Lastly, the Court should consider the more fundamental question of
whether the government should be in the business of putting to death the
volunteers they have trained, sent to war, and broken in the process.285 The
Court should find that it is unconscionable for the government to sentence
soldiers and veterans to death for criminal actions that would likely not
have happened but for their military service.
When a combat veteran with service-related PTSD or TBI commits a
capital crime, it is a unique circumstance that requires sparing them from
the hand of the executioner. No one ever deserves a "free pass" for killing
another person,286 but crafting a categorical exclusion to recognize the
mitigating nature of PTSD and TBI is the least that the government can do
281. See Michael S. Woodson, Soldiers for the Truth, SFTT Special Report: A Combat
Vet Needed for the Supreme Court, DEFENSEWATCH, July 12, 2005, http://www.sftt.org/cgi-
bin/csNews/csNews.cgi?command=viewone&id=19&database=DefenseWatch%202005%20
A.db; Military Officers Association of America, Declining Military Experience in Congress,
http://www.moaa.org/lac/ac-resources/lac-resources-tips/lac-resourcestips-decline.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009); U.S. Census Bureau, People: Veterans, http://factfinder.census.
gov/jsp/saff/SAFFInfo.jsp?_pageld=tp I 2 veterans (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
282. See Woodson, supra note 281; Military Officers Assoc. of Am., supra note 281;
U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 281.
283. See Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20; The Cases, supra note 20.
284. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 605 (1978)).
285. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 36, at 271; Tabak, supra note 3, at 299-300 (discussing
case of Vietnam veteran George Franklin Page on North Carolina's death row for killing
during a manic flashback episode).
286. Sontag & Alvarez, Combat Trauma, supra note 20.
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to account for the psychological wounds that have, in effect, been caused by
service to the nation.287  Such a categorical exclusion will prevent a
sentencer from construing these factors as aggravating to impose the death
penalty where it is unwarranted. 288
CONCLUSION
Because the existence of service-related PTSD or TBI in combat veterans
reduces personal culpability, these veterans cannot be regarded as "among
the worst offenders" and should not be subject to the ultimate sentence.
Presenting PTSD, TBI, and military training evidence to a sentencer during
the sentencing phase of a capital trial represents one way to avoid
subjecting combat veterans to the death penalty. Because the characteristics
of PTSD and TBI are similar to those of minors and the mentally retarded
that merit a categorical exclusion from the death penalty for those classes,
an exclusion for combat veterans suffering from PTSD or TBI at the time of
their offenses must be created by legislatures or the courts to ensure that
only the worst offenders receive their "just deserts" and are put to death.
287. See id.; supra notes 11-19 (describing the "[i]nvisible [w]ounds of [w]ar" that
veterans suffer after returning from war).
288. See supra Part III.
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